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Chapter 1
Introduction
Risk management is of crucial importance when we consider the enormous ﬁnancial risk our
economy is exposed to. The risks of many economic agents are regulated by various institutions.
External regulators at an international level are the International Actuarial Association (IAA) and
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), who determine the capital requirements
for insurance companies. Similarly, the Basel Committee gives guidelines for the acceptable
level of capital on banking supervision. Since a government or central bank could be a lender of
last resort for these institutions, and their default could cause serious problems, they are regulated
as well. To give a recent example, I think inadequate assessment of risk played a crucial role in
the current subprime mortgage crisis as well.
As an internal regulator, a portfolio manager has to regulate the risk of its traders. In the context
of a multi-division ﬁrm setting, the head-ofﬁce may also set risk-limits for the divisions. Inter-
nally the risk values can also be used for planning and performance evaluation. It is therefore
crucial to measure risk in an appropriate way.
In the sequel we will use the term portfolio when referring to any risky entity (ﬁrm, bank, insur-
ance company, etc.). A measure of risk assigns a real number to the probability distribution of
the future value of a portfolio. It can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash the regulated
agent has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a zero coupon bond for its risk to be accept-
able to the regulator. The literature knows of numerous possible ways to measure risk; lately
interest shifted to the axiomatic approach of coherent measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath, 1999). A coherent measure of risk (Deﬁnitions 2.1, 4.1) satisﬁes the following four
axioms: monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance. Adding
two more axioms, comonotonic additivity and law invariance, one obtains a subclass of coher-
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ent measures of risk, called spectral measures of risk (Acerbi, 2002), (Deﬁnitions 2.2, 4.2). For
an introduction to risk measures and the aforementioned axioms, see Chapter 4 of Fo¨llmer and
Schied (2002). Of the axioms, subadditivity and law invariance are the most important ones to
mention here. Subadditivity requires that the risk of an aggregate portfolio should not exceed the
total risk of the individual subportfolios: it captures the notion of diversiﬁcation; law invariance
holds if the risk of a portfolio depends only on its probability distribution. Subadditivity implies
that the risk of the aggregate portfolio is less than the sum of the risks of the individual portfo-
lios. The diversiﬁcation beneﬁts should be allocated somehow, preferably in a stable way, when
no collection of individual portfolios would be better off if they separate from the others. Two
natural questions arise:
1. Are coherent and spectral measures of risk a good way to measure risk?
2. How to allocate risk?
This thesis is devoted to the study of those questions from a microeconomic perspective, using
tools from general equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory.
1.1 General Equilibrium Theory
General equilibrium (GE) theory captures the notion that markets are interrelated. If we want
to take into account those dependencies, then it is not enough to consider a standard supply and
demand partial equilibrium model. An exchange economy in a dynamic GE model consists of a
number of consumers maximizing their utility over a ﬁnite number of time periods. Production
decisions are assumed to be exogenously given, thus there are no ﬁrms in such models. In each
time period there is uncertainty about the state of nature to be realized, which determines the
amount of goods and services, called commodities a consumer will be endowed with. As an
example, you can think of a farmer and the weather caused uncertainties in the production of
crops.
Consumers can exchange commodities in each time period and they can also trade with assets
before a particular state of nature is realized. An asset speciﬁes the amount of commodities their
owner will get depending on the realized state of nature. A zero coupon bond, a stock of a ﬁrm,
even options can be modeled as an asset. A zero coupon bond provides the same amount of
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money in all states of nature; a stock as an asset speciﬁes the stock price in each state of nature.
A call option gives its owner the right (but not the obligation) of buying a stock at a given price
(called strike price) at a certain time. A call option as an asset provides zero payoff if the stock
price is below the strike price, and the difference between the stock price and the strike price
when the stock price is above the strike price.
When consumers are assumed to be price takers, then a consumption bundle, prices of commodi-
ties and assets constitute a competitive equilibrium (Deﬁnition 2.14) if there is no excess supply
or excess demand in any commodities or assets.
In Chapter 2 we analyze the axioms of coherent measures of risk using an exchange economy.
We consider one representative consumer, where the stochastic endowment of the consumer
represents the market portfolio. This approach has the advantage that it recognizes the fact that
the risk of a portfolio depends on the market portfolio, an insight that is generated immediately
by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
By doing so we contribute to the research agenda that connects ﬁnance to GE theory, see for
instance Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996), Leroy and Werner (2001),
or Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001). The corresponding measure of risk of a portfolio is the amount of
cash needed to sell the risk involved in the portfolio to the market. More precisely, the so-called
GE measure of risk (Deﬁnition 2.18) of a portfolio is the negative of its equilibrium market price
in the exchange economy.
We prove that the GE measure of risk is a coherent measure of risk (Proposition 2.20), thus
coherent measures of risk are compatible with a natural general equilibrium approach to measure
risk. However, using the insight of the CAPM that the risk of a portfolio does not only depend
on the probability distribution of its payoff, but also on how these payoffs are correlated to those
of the market portfolio, we show that the GE measure of risk does not satisfy law invariance
(Example 2.21), and is therefore not a spectral measure of risk.
1.2 Cooperative Game Theory
We model the problem of risk allocation by cooperative games. A noncooperative game consists
of the set of players, their strategies and the payoffs depending on the strategies selected by the
players. In cooperative games strategies are implicit, they are expressed by considering groups
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of players, called coalitions. Payoffs are typically given to these coalitions rather than to the
individual players. The solution of such a game must therefore specify the distribution of these
payoffs. Unlike in noncooperative games, players can make binding commitments, or contracts
that also determine the payoff allocation.
A transferable utility (TU) game originating from the famous book by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) consists of a ﬁnite set of players and a value function specifying the maximum
attainable utility (money) for all the coalitions of players. The core of a TU game consists of
those efﬁcient allocations which are robust against all coalitional deviations. It is well-known
that the core in a TU game is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced (Bondareva, 1963;
Shapley, 1967). One interpretation of balancedness (Deﬁnition 3.1) is that the players can dis-
tribute one unit of working time to any coalition and in doing so cannot generate more value than
the grand coalition, where everybody cooperates with everybody.
One obtains a subgame by restricting the game to a subset of players. The core of every subgame
of a TU game is non-empty if and only if the game is totally balanced (Deﬁnition 3.2). Totally
balanced games arise from a wide range of applications: they coincide with market games (Shap-
ley and Shubik, 1969), they are are generated by linear production games, they are equivalent to
a class of maximum ﬂow problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982a) and also to permutation games of
less than four players (Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Prassad, 1984).
In Chapter 3 we provide a set of linear programming problems to study a subclass of totally
balanced games, exact games (Schmeidler, 1972), (Deﬁnition 3.3). A game is exact if for each
coalition there is a core allocation such that the coalition only gets its stand-alone value. By the
linear programming problems one can easily check whether a game is exact or not. Using the
dual of the linear programming problems we develop two new characterizations of exact games,
complementing earlier characterizations by Schmeidler (1972) and Azrieli and Lehrer (2005).
First, we show (Theorem 3.11) that a game is exact if an only if it is exactly balanced (Deﬁnition
3.9). The condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except for the
following. In exact balancedness it holds that even if players in one coalition are allowed to work
overtime in any combination of the coalitions, their best choice is still to stick to their original
coalition. We show that exact balancedness implies total balancedness.
The second characterization (Theorem 3.13) spells out what more than total balancedness is
needed to obtain exactness. It says that a game is exact if an only if it is totally balanced and
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overbalanced (Deﬁnition 3.12). In case of overbalancedness, no weight is put on the grand
coalition and one coalition works a non-negative amount of overtime. From this characterization
it follows immediately that an exact game is totally balanced. The characterizations can be used
to verify exactness of a game, we apply them in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 4 we come back to the question of the distribution of the risk diversiﬁcation bene-
ﬁts. Risk allocation games (Denault, 2001), (Deﬁnition 4.12) are transferable utility cooperative
games deﬁned to this purpose. Note that we have found the axioms of coherent measures of risk
(Deﬁnitions 2.1, 4.1) compatible with a natural general equilibrium approach to measure risk in
Chapter 2. A risk allocation game arises from a risk environment specifying a number of portfo-
lios and a coherent measure of risk determining the risk of each portfolio. Coalitions of agents
can combine their portfolios and thereby create diversiﬁcation gains.
We prove (Theorem 4.17) that the class of risk allocation games also coincides with the class of
totally balanced games. This result ensures that a regulator can always allocate risk in a stable
way. No matter how the risk environment changes, there is always an allocation of risk that no
coalition of portfolios can object to.
To get exact games, we need an extra condition, since exact games are a subclass of totally
balanced games. Usually the risk of the aggregate portfolio is low compared to the risk involved
in the individual portfolios. As an extreme case, no aggregate uncertainty refers to the case when
the value of the aggregate portfolio is constant over all states of nature. We prove (Theorem 4.23)
that the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of
exact games. To show that all risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty are exact, we
use the overbalancedness condition developed in Chapter 3.
Thus, in the case of no aggregate uncertainty, for each coalition of portfolios, this coalition does
not necessarily beneﬁt from the diversiﬁcation opportunities offered by the aggregate portfo-
lio. As a consequence, the regulator has a high level of discretion in allocating the risk to the
individual portfolios in this case.
The results that the class of risk allocation games in general coincides with the class of totally
balanced games, and with no aggregate uncertainty we get the class of exact games are extremely
useful in establishing the general properties of standard solution concepts used in cooperative
game theory when applied to risk allocation games.
Convex games with transferable utility (Deﬁnition 4.10) introduced by Shapley (1971) provide a
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further reﬁnement of exact games, since convex games are a subset of exact games. They arise
from a wide range of applications. Airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy
games (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), sequencing games (Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs, 1989) and
standard tree games (Granot, Maschler, Owen, and Zhu, 1996) are all convex. If the number of
players (individual portfolios) below four, we show that one obtains the class of convex games
in risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty (Theorem 4.24).
The assumption of transferable utility can be relaxed to obtain the class of games with non-
transferable utility (NTU games, for short). In a TU game it is assumed that utilities can be
transferred. Such an assumption is justiﬁed if there is a commodity which has the same marginal
utility for everyone and the utility functions are linear and separable in it. In general, this is
not the case and one would like to study the more general class of NTU games. An NTU game
speciﬁes the set of attainable utility levels for the members of each coalition.
The notion of convexity can be generalized to NTU games in at least ﬁve ways. Vilkov (1977)
and Sharkey (1981) have extended convexity to NTU games to deﬁne ordinal (Deﬁnition 5.8) and
cardinal convexity (Deﬁnition 5.9), respectively. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) analyze
coalition merge convexity (Deﬁnition 5.11), individual merge convexity (Deﬁnition 5.12), and
marginal convexity (Deﬁnition 5.13) in an NTU setting.
Ordinally convex NTU games have numerous applications. Peleg (1984) transforms a social
choice situation with a convex effectivity function into an NTU game which is ordinally convex.
Demange (1987) provides two examples: a model of public good, and a production economy
with increasing returns to scale; Masuzawa (2003) adds N-person prisoners’ dilemma games
and oligopoly models to this class.
The aforementioned ﬁve classes of NTU convex games do not coincide in general. The only
general result is that coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity, and individ-
ual merge convexity implies marginal convexity. It is natural to seek a result that is analogous
to convex TU games being exact. In Chapter 5 we generalize exactness to the NTU setting. In
an exact NTU game (Deﬁnition 5.16) for each coalition there is a core element on the bound-
ary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does not necessarily beneﬁt from the gains of
forming the grand coalition in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional deviations. We
show (Theorem 5.22, Corollary 5.24) that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and
marginal convexity can be uniﬁed under NTU exactness.
Chapter 2
Coherent Measures of Risk from a General
Equilibrium Perspective
Coherent measures of risk deﬁned by the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homo-
geneity, and translation invariance are recent tools in risk management to assess the amount of
risk agents are exposed to. If they also satisfy law invariance and comonotonic additivity, then
we get a subclass of them: spectral measures of risk. Expected shortfall is a well-known spectral
measure of risk.
In this chapter1 we investigate the above mentioned six axioms using tools from general equili-
brium (GE) theory. Coherent and spectral measures of risk are compared to the natural measure
of risk derived from an exchange economy model, which we call the GE measure of risk. We
prove that GE measures of risk are coherent measures of risk. We also show that spectral mea-
sures of risk are GE measures of risk only under stringent conditions, since spectral measures of
risk do not take the regulated entity’s relation to the market portfolio into account. To give more
insights, we characterize the set of GE measures of risk via the pricing kernel property.
2.1 Introduction
Risk management is of crucial importance considering the enormous ﬁnancial risk our economy
is exposed to. The risks of many economic agents are regulated by various institutions. For
example, if a ﬁnancial trader wants to sell options, which give the buyer rights of buying or
selling at a given price during a speciﬁed time horizon (or at a given time), he has to fulﬁl margin
requirements, that is he has to deposit some cash or some other riskless and liquid instrument. An
1This chapter is based on Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007b).
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exchange’s clearing ﬁrm, which is responsible for the promises to all parties of transactions being
securely completed, requires margin deposits. A measure of risk can be used to determine the
margin requirement. The riskier the trader’s portfolio, the more the margin requirement should
be.
Other external regulators, at an international level, are the International Actuarial Association
(IAA) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), who determine the capital
requirements for insurance companies. Similarly, the Basel Committee gives guidelines for the
acceptable level of capital on banking supervision. Since a government or central bank could
be a lender of last resort for these institutions, and their default could cause serious problems,
they are regulated as well. As an internal regulator, a portfolio manager has to regulate the risk
of its traders. In the context of a multi-division ﬁrm setting, the head-ofﬁce may also set risk-
limits for the divisions. Internally the risk values can also be used for planning and performance
evaluation. It is therefore crucial to measure risk in an appropriate way.
We will use the term portfolio when referring to a risky entity (portfolio, ﬁrm, insurance com-
pany, bank, etc.). The value of a portfolio might change due to all kinds of uncertain events.
We relate risk to the probability distribution of the future value of the portfolio. For the sake of
simplicity in this chapter we use discrete random variables. Our approach can be extended to
the case of continuous risks and risks with unbounded support. All this requires is an analysis of
competitive equilibrium in such an environment. The interested reader is referred to Chapter 10
of Dufﬁe (2001) .
A measure of risk assigns a real number to a random variable. It is the minimal amount of cash
the regulated agent has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a zero coupon bond. Coherent
measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) are deﬁned by four axioms: mono-
tonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance. When adding two more
axioms: law invariance and comonotonic additivity we get a subclass of coherent measures of
risk, namely spectral measures of risk (Acerbi, 2002). Expected shortfall is a well-known spec-
tral measure of risk (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). For an introduction to risk measures and the
above mentioned axioms see for instance Chapter 4 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002).
Our approach is to model the situation at hand as an exchange economy in a general equilibrium
(GE) setting, and determine which axioms are compatible with this model, and whether other
axioms emerge as natural. This approach has the advantage that it recognizes the fact that the
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risk of a portfolio depends on the other assets present in the economy (the market portfolio), an
insight that is generated immediately by the Capital Asset Pricing Model as developed by Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965). By doing so we would like to contribute to the research agenda that
connects ﬁnance to GE theory, see for instance Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990), Magill and
Quinzii (1996), Leroy and Werner (2001), or Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001). The corresponding
measure of risk of a portfolio would be the amount of cash needed to sell the risk involved in the
portfolio to the market. More precisely, the so-called GE measure of risk of a portfolio would be
the negative of its equilibrium market price.
We prove that GE measures of risk are coherent and comonotonic additive measures of risk.
However, GE measures of risk fail to satisfy law invariance, that is they are functions of not only
the probability distributions of the portfolios, since they also take the regulated entity’s relation
to the market portfolio into account. Nevertheless we show that GE measures of risk satisfy a
generalized notion of law invariance. To check on which domain spectral measures of risk are
GE measures of risk, we consider a general domain for the measures of risk. We ﬁnd that the
corresponding domain is very small. To give more insights, we characterize GE measures of risk
as the only measures of risk satisfying the property that we call the pricing kernel property.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss coherent measures of risk.
In Section 2.3 spectral measures of risk are considered. Using the exchange economy model of
Section 2.4 the properties of GE measures of risk are investigated in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6
we show that spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk only under stringent conditions,
and we characterize GE measures of risk via the pricing kernel property. We conclude in Section
2.7.
2.2 Coherent Measures of Risk
Consider a set V ⊆ RS of realization vectors, where S denotes the number of states of nature.
State of nature s occurs with probability ps > 0 and
∑S
s=1 ps = 1. The vector X ∈ V represents
a portfolio’s (ﬁrm’s, insurance company’s, bank’s, etc.) possible proﬁt and loss realizations on
a common chosen future time horizon, say at t = 1. The amount Xs is the portfolio’s payoff
in state of nature s. Negative values of Xs correspond to losses. The inequality Y ≥ X means
that Ys ≥ Xs for all s = 1, . . . , S. We deﬁne R+ = [0,∞), R++ = (0,∞), R− = (−∞, 0],
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respectively. The discrete random variable generated by p ∈ RS++ and X ∈ V is denoted by Xˆ ,
that is P (Xˆ = Xs) = ps, for all s = 1, . . . , S.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : V → R measuring the risk of a portfolio from the perspective
of the present (t = 0). It is the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent has to add to his
portfolio, and to invest in a reference instrument today, such that it ensures that the risk involved
in the portfolio is acceptable to the regulator.2 We assume that the reference instrument has
payoff 1 in each state of nature at t = 1, thus its realization vector is 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ V . The
reference instrument is riskless in the “classical sense”, having no uncertainty in its payoffs. It
is most natural to think of it as a zero coupon bond. The price of the reference instrument, the
discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ R+.
We adjust the deﬁnition of coherent measures of risk to the discrete case with realization vectors
on a general domain V as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A function ρ : V → R is called a coherent measure of risk (Artzner et al., 1999)
if it satisﬁes the following axioms.
1. Monotonicity: for all X, Y ∈ V such that Y ≥ X , we have ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity: for all X, Y ∈ V such that X + Y ∈ V , we have
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity: for all X ∈ V, h ∈ R+ such that hX ∈ V , we have
ρ(hX) = hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ V and a ∈ R such that X + a1 ∈ V , we have
ρ(X + a1) = ρ(X)− δa.
The axioms are motivated as follows.
By monotonicity, if a portfolio Y is always worth at least as much as X (event by event), then Y
cannot be riskier than X .
Subadditivity says that if we combine two portfolios, the risk is not greater than the sum of the
risks associated with each: it captures the notion of diversiﬁcation. If an exchange’s measure of
2The measure of risk can also be negative, meaning that a portfolio remains acceptable if a certain amount of
cash is withdrawn from it.
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risk would fail to satisfy this property, then a trader could be better off by splitting his position,
opening two accounts and decreasing the margin requirements. The same motivation applies to
ﬁrms, banks, insurance companies, etc. For instance, for the case of internal capital budgeting,
if the measure of risk satisﬁes subadditivity, then the head ofﬁce can be sure that by setting risk
limits to the divisions, the risk of the whole ﬁrm will be smaller than the sum of the individual
risk limits. This enables the head ofﬁce to decentralize the risk constraints.
Positive homogeneity requires that portfolio size should linearly inﬂuence risk.
Translation invariance ensures that the measure of risk is expressed in appropriate units. It means
that investing an amount δa > 0 (or δa < 0) of cash into a units of reference instrument at t = 0
leads to the payoff vector a1 at t = 1 and decreases (respectively: increases) the measure of risk
by δa.
For further motivation of the axioms see Artzner et al., 1999.
The four axioms above seem natural, but one can easily create counterexamples showing that the
rather popular Value at Risk (VaR) is not subadditive in general and hence it is not a coherent
measure of risk, see for instance Artzner et al. (1999), or Embrechts, McNeil, and Straumann
(2002). However, according to Embrechts et al. (2002) VaR is coherent for elliptically dis-
tributed risks. Moreover, Ibragimov (2005) shows that VaR satisﬁes the coherency axioms for
not extremely heavy-tailed risks with ﬁnite means and convolutions of α-symmetric risks with
α > 1, but VaR always lacks the coherency property for extremely heavy-tailed risks with inﬁnite
ﬁrst moments and convolutions of α-symmetric risks with α < 1. As a byproduct checking the
relevance of the coherency axioms from a general equilibrium perspective enables us to assess
this criticism on VaR as well.
2.3 Spectral Measures of Risk
Acerbi (2002) treats spectral measures of risk in case of discrete random variables with equiprob-
able outcomes, that is when p1 = · · · = pS = 1/S, as a special case. He assumes that the
discount factor is 1, and the domain is RS . In this chapter we explicitly want to use the dis-
count factor, which for the moment is exogenously determined here as the price of the reference
instrument. Since in the general equilibrium model the discount factor will be determined en-
dogenously, we have to multiply Acerbi (2002)’s deﬁnition by δ. Our model is a generalization
12 Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective
also in the sense that we consider a general domain V ⊆ RS . The deﬁnition of spectral measures
of risk with equiprobable outcomes is as follows.
Let us introduce the ordered statistics Xs:S given by the ordered values of the S-tuple
X1, . . . , XS , that is {X1:S, . . . , XS:S} = {X1, . . . , XS} and X1:S ≤ X2:S ≤ · · · ≤ XS:S.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let the outcomes be equiprobable. Consider a domain V ⊆ RS , and a vector
φ ∈ RS . The measure Mφ : V → R deﬁned by
Mφ(X) = −δ
S∑
s=1
φsXs:S (2.1)
is a spectral measure of risk if φ ∈ RS satisﬁes the conditions
1. Nonnegativity: φs ≥ 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S,
2. Normalization:
∑S
s=1 φs = 1,
3. Monotonicity : φs is non-increasing, that is φs1 ≥ φs2 if s1 < s2 and s1, s2 ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Spectral measures of risk are calculated as discounted weighted average losses, with non-
increasing weights, with the highest weight on the worst outcome. The weight vector φ is the
so-called risk spectrum . It can be interpreted as expressing the attitude toward risk. As a special
case we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , S}. The k-expected shortfall of the realization vector X is
deﬁned by
ESk(X) = −δ
k∑
s=1
1
k
Xs:S. (2.2)
The k-expected shortfall is the discounted average of the worst k outcomes. With an unrestricted
domain, that is if V = RS , Acerbi (2002) has the following result.
Proposition 2.4. Assume V = RS . A measure of risk Mφ : V → R is coherent if and only if it
is a spectral measure of risk as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 2.2.
Proof. Acerbi (2002), Theorem 5.3. 
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Of course on a restricted domain, that is if V ⊂ RS , spectral measures of risk still satisfy the four
coherency axioms. However, as the following three examples show, depending on V one might
ﬁnd other measures of risk Mφ : V → R that are coherent but not spectral measures of risk.
Example 2.5. As a trivial example, let V contain only one vector, X . In this case all measures
of risk, i.e. all functions ρ : V → R satisfy the six axioms, since there are no two vectors on
which the axioms of monotonicity, subadditivity, etc. could be checked. Note that in this case
spectral measures of risk are those functions ρ : V → R that satisfy
−
δ
S
S∑
s=1
Xs:S ≤ ρ(X) ≤ −δX1:S. (2.3)
For all functions ρ satisfying (2.3) there is φ ∈ RS such that Mφ = ρ and Mφ is a spectral
measure of risk.
Interestingly, Equation (2.3) can also be justiﬁed using majorization theory. A vector φ ∈ RS is
said to be majorized by a vector γ ∈ RS , written φ ≺ γ, if∑Si=k φi:S ≤∑Si=k γi:S, k = 2, . . . , S
and
∑S
i=1 φi:S =
∑S
i=1 γi:S. It is easy to see that for a risk spectrum φ ∈ RS we have that
(
1
S
, . . . ,
1
S
) ≺ (φ1, . . . , φS) ≺ (1, 0, . . . , 0). (2.4)
It follows from 3.H.2.c and 4.b.7 in Marshall and Olkin (1979) that Mφ is Schur-convex in φ,
that is if φ1 ≺ φ2, then for any X ∈ V we have that Mφ1(X) ≤ Mφ2(X). From this observation
and the relations in (2.4), Equation (2.3) follows immediately.
Example 2.6. In his proof of Theorem 5.3 (Proposition 2.4 here) Acerbi (2002) shows for the
case V = RS that if a measure of risk Mφ : V → R is monotone, then its risk spectrum φ should
be nonnegative. If for a certain s we have that φs < 0, then for any X ∈ V an increase in Xs:S
gives rise to a higher measure of risk, contradicting monotonicity.
However, for many domains V , positivity is not required for monotonicity. Consider a domain
V = RS−1− × {0}. In this case the best outcome of any portfolio is zero, thus the weight of the
best outcome, φS can be negative, since the best outcome cannot be increased. So although φ is
not nonnegative everywhere, the measure of risk remains monotone.
Example 2.7. In his proof of Theorem 5.3 (Proposition 2.4 here) Acerbi (2002) also shows
for the case V = RS that if a measure of risk Mφ : V → R is translation invariant, then
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its risk spectrum φ should be normalized. If φ is not normalized, then it is easy to check that
translation invariance fails. It sufﬁces to consider Mφ(X) and Mφ(Y ), where Y = X + a1, and
a ∈ R, a = 0.
For general domains V , normalization is not required for translation invariance. For instance,
translation invariance is trivially satisﬁed if there are no two vectors X and Y such that X =
Y + a1 for some a ∈ R, a = 0. In this case translation invariance does not have bite and
normalization can be omitted.
Any measure of risk Mφ : V → R and in particular spectral measures of risk can be shown
to satisfy the axioms of law-invariance and comonotonic additivity, since they use the ordered
statistics of a portfolio. The deﬁnitions of these two axioms are as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.8. A measure of risk ρ : V → R is law invariant if for all X, Y ∈ V such that for
all s = 1, . . . , S,
Pr(Xˆ = Xs) = Pr(Yˆ = Xs),
we have ρ(X) = ρ(Y ).
Law invariance of ρ means that the measure of risk is a function of the probability distribution
(law) only. Note that two random variables Xˆ and Yˆ can be different despite the fact that they
have the same probability distribution. Acerbi (2004) explains that law invariance can be thought
of as the property of “being estimable from empirical data”. We will point out in Section 2.5 that
the portfolios’ relations to the economy as a whole are also important, which will be shown
to violate the law invariance axiom. For instance, if two portfolios have different covariances
with the market portfolio, then the regulator may perceive their risk differently, even if their
probability distribution is the same.
Another characteristic of spectral measures of risk is comonotonic additivity.
Deﬁnition 2.9. Two realization vectors X ∈ RS and Y ∈ RS are comonotonic if for all s1, s2 ∈
{1, . . . , S},
(Xs1 −Xs2)(Ys1 − Ys2) ≥ 0. (2.5)
A map ρ : V → R is comonotonic additive if given two comonotonic realization vectors X, Y ∈
V such that X + Y ∈ V the map displays additivity, that is we have ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
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Comonotonicity is a very strong form of dependence that two realization vectors X and Y can
display. If two portfolios are comonotonic, then their value will always move up and down
together event by event, providing no diversiﬁcation at all when added to each other. The measure
of risk of a portfolio consisting of two comonotonic subportfolios should therefore be equal to
the sum of the measures of risk of the subportfolios. Using random variables the deﬁnition of
comonotonicity is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.10. Two random variables Xˆ and Yˆ are comonotonic if Xˆ = f(Yˆ ) (almost surely)
for some increasing function f : R→ R.
The deﬁnitions of comonotonicity for realization vectors and random variables are equivalent.
For two random variables with continuous distributions Xˆ and Yˆ the inequality in (2.5) holds
for their realization vectors X and Y if and only if we have that the probability of concordance
deﬁned by P ((Xˆ − Xˆ ′)(Yˆ − Yˆ ′) ≥ 0) = 1 and consequently the probability of discordance
given by P ((Xˆ − Xˆ ′)(Yˆ − Yˆ ′) ≤ 0) = 0, where Xˆ ′ and Yˆ ′ are independent copies of Xˆ and Yˆ .
In this case, one of the commonly used measures of dependence, Kendall’s tau deﬁned by
ρτ = P ((Xˆ − Xˆ
′)(Yˆ − Yˆ ′) ≥ 0)− P ((Xˆ − Xˆ ′)(Yˆ − Yˆ ′) ≤ 0) (2.6)
reaches its maximum value, that is ρτ = 1. From Theorem 3 in Embrechts et al. (2002) it
follows that ρτ = 1 is equivalent with saying that Xˆ and Yˆ are comonotonic as deﬁned by
Deﬁnition 2.10. For Kendall’s tau and related measures of dependence see for instance Chapter
5 in Nelsen (1999).
Tasche (2002) shows that in the continuous, non-atomic case spectral measures of risk are the
only coherent measures of risk satisfying law-invariance and comonotonic additivity. As his
proof requires non-atomic probability distributions, in the discrete, equiprobable case a new
proof is required for the analogous statement. The proposition requires an unrestricted domain,
that is V = RS .
Proposition 2.11. Assume that the outcomes are equiprobable and V = RS . Then a measure of
risk is coherent, law invariant and comonotonic additive if and only if it is a spectral measure of
risk as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 2.2.
Proof.
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(⇐) The coherency part follows from Proposition 2.4. Law invariance and comonotonic addi-
tivity follows from the fact that spectral measures of risk are using the ordered statistics of a
realization vector.
(⇒) Take any law invariant and comonotonic additive measure of risk ρ : RS → R satisfying
the four coherency axioms. We will show that law invariance and comonotonic additivity of ρ
implies that it can be written in the form of Equation (2.1), that is there exists a vector φ ∈ RS
such that for all X ∈ RS we have that
ρ(X) = Mφ(X) = −δ
S∑
s=1
φsXs:S. (2.7)
Law invariance of ρ implies that for all X ∈ RS any permutation of X has the same measure
of risk. A particular permutation is the ordered statistics vector of X , [Xs:S]. Using the notation
X¯ = {X ∈ RS|X1 ≤ X2 ≤ · · · ≤ XS} for the space of ordered statistics, we have that for all
X ∈ RS the measure of risk ρ can be written as a function f : X¯ → R of the ordered statistics
vector,
ρ(X) = f([Xs:S]). (2.8)
Comonotonic additivity of ρ implies that f is linear on X¯ . Choosing S independent vectors in X¯
implies that f is additive separable with constant weight functions φ¯1, . . . , φ¯S ∈ R, that is
f([Xs:S]) = φ¯1X1:S + · · ·+ φ¯SXS:S. (2.9)
Using φs = − φ¯sδ , s = 1, . . . , S we have that Equation (2.7) is satisﬁed. Proposition 2.4 implies
that ρ should be a spectral measure of risk. 
It is cumbersome to generalize the deﬁnition of spectral measures of risk to the case in which the
outcomes are not equiprobable. Consider the following example.
Example 2.12. In Table 2.1 we have 4 states of nature with equal probability of occurrence. Port-
folios X and Y , their ordered statistics, and the risk spectrum φ are also given. A straightforward
calculation gives Mφ(X) = 0, and Mφ(Y ) = 3.5δ.
Since the portfolios X and Y have the same outcome in states of nature 2, 3 and 4, we can merge
those states. This operation leads to Table 2.2, with portfolios X ′ and Y ′, where the generalized
discrete risk spectrum φg is given by φg1 = φ1 and φ
g
2 = φ2 + φ3 + φ4.
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s ps Xs Xs:S Ys Ys:S φs
1 0.25 -3 -3 1 -4 0.4
2 0.25 2 2 -4 -4 0.3
3 0.25 2 2 -4 -4 0.2
4 0.25 2 2 -4 1 0.1
Table 2.1: Spectral measures of risk with equiprobable outcomes.
s p′s X
′
s X
′
s:S Y
′
s Y
′
s:S φ
g
s
1 0.25 -3 -3 1 -4 0.4
2 0.75 2 2 -4 1 0.6
Table 2.2: Spectral measures of risk with not equiprobable outcomes.
By deﬁning Mφg(X) = −δ
∑S
s=1 φ
g
sXs:S we have that Mφ(X) = Mφg(X ′) = 0, but Mφ(Y ) =
3.5δ, whereas Mφg(Y ′) = δ. To avoid this problem, within the discrete setting a different φg
should be speciﬁed for all the orderings of the portfolio vectors. This would rather complicate
the analysis and would not add much value since with splitting up the states and increasing their
number any discrete distribution can be arbitrarily closely approximated by equiprobable states.
Thus we will use the discrete, equiprobable version of spectral measures of risk as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2.2 in the sequel.
2.4 An Exchange Economy Model
Next we discuss the four axioms underlying coherent measures of risk and the additional two axi-
oms of spectral measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective. We do this by checking
the validity of the six axioms on the natural measure of risk derived from an exchange economy
model, which we call the General Equilibrium (GE) measure of risk. The GE measure of risk of
a portfolio is the amount of cash needed to sell the risk involved in the portfolio to the market.
More precisely, it is the minimal amount of cash needed to add to the portfolio, such that its
market price becomes nonnegative. It is easy to see that the GE measure of risk of a portfolio is
the negative of its equilibrium market price.
To specify the GE measure of risk we consider an exchange economy model with two time
periods (t = 0, t = 1) and uncertainty concerning the state of nature in period t = 1. We assume
that for each state s in the set {1, . . . , S} its probability of occurrence is objectively known,
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ps = 1/S.
3 Period t = 0 is identiﬁed with state s = 0. There is a unique nondurable commodity
(income) in each state of nature s = 0, . . . , S.
The portfolios (ﬁrms, insurance companies, banks, etc.) are represented as exogenously given
realization vectors in RS . Their payoff is a proﬁt or loss in state of nature s = 1, . . . , S.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the economy can be modeled by means of a representa-
tive agent. However, it is not difﬁcult to extend the model to the case with heterogeneous agents.
We assume that the consumption set of the agent is R in all states of nature. His consumption
stream is denoted by c = (c0, . . . , cS) ∈ RS+1.
The agent’s preferences are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u :
R
S+1 → R, given by
u(c0, . . . , cS) = v0(c0) + δ¯
S∑
s=1
psv(cs),
where v0 : R → R and v : R → R are elementary (Bernoulli) utility functions in state 0 and
states s = 1, . . . , S respectively; the scalar δ¯ ∈ R++ is the subjective discount factor of the agent.
Moreover, the representative agent is characterized by his (aggregate) endowment
ω = (ω0, . . . , ωS) ∈ RS+1. The endowment expresses the agent’s consumption possibilities
without trade, depending on the realization of the state of nature. To distinguish between the sure
zero-period endowment and the random ﬁrst-period endowment, we deﬁne ω˜ = (ω1, . . . , ωS).
We assume that income transfers across all states are possible, that is markets are complete.
Without loss of generality we assume that there are S contingent contracts .
Deﬁnition 2.13. A contingent contract for state s (s = 1, . . . , S) is a promise to deliver one unit
of income in state s and nothing otherwise. The price of the contingent contract, the state price,
expressed in units of period 0 income, is denoted by πs for s = 1, . . . , S. Furthermore, π0 = 1.
The agent can sell his endowment ω, from which he can purchase on the contingent markets any
consumption stream c satisfying the budget inequality
S∑
s=0
πscs ≤
S∑
s=0
πsωs. (2.10)
The agent’s utility function and his endowment deﬁne an economy E = (u, ω). The equilibrium
state prices are determined by the notion of competitive equilibrium.
3We shall only employ the equiprobable assumption when comparing GE measures of risk to spectral measures
of risk.
2.4 An Exchange Economy Model 19
Deﬁnition 2.14. A competitive equilibrium for an economy E = (u, ω) is a consumption vector
c∗ = (c∗0, . . . , c
∗
S) and state price vector π∗ = (π∗1 , . . . , π∗S) that satisfy the following conditions:
1. c∗ ∈ arg maxc u(c0, . . . , cS) s.t.
∑S
s=0 π
∗
scs ≤
∑S
s=0 π
∗
sωs,
2. c∗ = ω.
We present two sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with nonnegative state
prices.
Proposition 2.15. Consider an economy E = (u, ω). If the elementary utility function v0 : R→
R is strictly monotonic and concave and v : R→ R is monotone and concave, then a competitive
equilibrium (c∗, π∗) exists. Moreover, π∗s ≥ 0 for s = 1, . . . , S.
Let U denote the set of utility functions u in which the elementary utility functions v0 : R→ R
and v : R→ R are twice differentiable, v′0 > 0, v′′0 ≤ 0 and v′ ≥ 0, v′′ ≤ 0.
Proposition 2.16. Consider an economy E = (u, ω). If u ∈ U , then the competitive equilibrium
(c∗, π∗) is unique. Moreover,
π∗s =
∂u(ω)
∂cs
∂u(ω)
∂c0
=
δ¯psv
′(ωs)
v′0(ω0)
≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , S. (2.11)
The proofs of Proposition 2.15 and Proposition 2.16 are standard results in microeconomic the-
ory, see for instance Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.15 or Proposition 2.16 one can deﬁne the equilibrium
price of any portfolio Z ∈ RS .
Deﬁnition 2.17. If (c∗, π∗) is a competitive equilibrium of an economy E = (u, ω), then the
equilibrium price, q∗Z of the portfolio Z ∈ RS is given by q∗Z =
∑S
s=1 π
∗
sZs.
Note that under the assumption of Proposition 2.16 the equilibrium price of the portfolio Z ∈ RS
is uniquely given by
q∗Z =
S∑
s=1
π∗sZs = δ¯
∑S
s=1 psv
′(ωs)Zs
v′0(ω0)
. (2.12)
As an important special case of Equation (2.12), the discount factor becomes
δ = q∗1 =
S∑
s=1
π∗s1 = δ¯
∑S
s=1 psv
′(ωs)
v′0(ω0)
. (2.13)
Note that the discount factor is endogenously determined in the exchange economy model.
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2.5 General Equilibrium Measures of Risk
Now we can deﬁne the GE measure of risk of a portfolio as the negative of its equilibrium market
price.
Deﬁnition 2.18. Consider an economy E = (u, ω) with competitive equilibrium (c∗, π∗) and a
domain V . The GE measure of risk is the map ρu,ω : V → R, where ρu,ω(Z) = −q∗Z for any
Z ∈ V .
Note that Deﬁnition 2.17 and Deﬁnition 2.18 imply that for any Z ∈ V
ρu,ω(Z) = −q
∗
Z = −
S∑
s=1
π∗sZs. (2.14)
Notice that ρu,ω is a linear function.
Example 2.19. Consider an economy E = (u, ω) and a domain V . Let v0(c0) = c0 − 12αc
2
0 and
v(cs) = cs −
1
2
αc2s for s = 1, . . . , S, where α ∈ R++ such that 1− αωs > 0, s = 0, . . . , S, that
is the elementary utility functions are quadratic and increasing at c∗ = ω. Since u ∈ U , using
Equations (2.11) and (2.14) the GE measure of risk of Z ∈ V is given by
ρu,ω(Z) = −q
∗
Z = −
S∑
s=1
π∗sZs = −δ¯
∑S
s=1 psv
′(ωs)Zs
v′0(ω0)
= −δ¯
∑S
s=1 ps(1− αωs)Zs
(1− αω0)
. (2.15)
One can also look at the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment ω˜ as representing the market
portfolio, since it captures the aggregate uncertainties. Let us denote the total return of any
portfolio Z by rZ , where the total return is the payoff vector divided by the price: rZ = Z/q∗Z .
It is well known (see for instance Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990)) that with a quadratic utility
function the CAPM formula holds. It relates the total return of any portfolio to the total return of
the market portfolio as follows.
E(rZ) = r1 + βZ(E(rω˜)− r1), where βZ = Cov(rZ ,rω˜)V ar(rω˜) . (2.16)
Note that the total return of the reference instrument is given by r1 = 1/δ. From q∗Z =
E(Z)/E(rZ) and Equation (2.16) it follows that
ρu,ω(Z) = −q
∗
Z = −
E(Z)
r1 + βZ(E(rω˜)− r1)
. (2.17)
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Thus if the elementary utility functions are quadratic, then the GE measure of risk of portfolio
Z is its discounted expected loss −E(Z)/r1 = −δE(Z), corrected with its risk relation to the
aggregate endowment.
Using the differentiability assumption let us denote the set of GE measures of risk on V by GV ,
where
GV = {ρu,ω : V → R|u ∈ U , ω ∈ R
S+1}.
Let us discuss some properties of GV .
Proposition 2.20. Any ρu,ω ∈ GV is a coherent measure of risk.
Proof. By Proposition 2.16, π∗s ≥ 0 for s = 1, . . . , S. Using this fact and the linearity of
ρu,ω monotonicity, subadditivity and positive homogeneity follows immediately. For translation
invariance note that δ =
∑S
s=1 π
∗
s by Equation (2.13). Then for all Z ∈ V , for all a ∈ R such
that Z + a1 ∈ V , we have
ρu,ω(Z + 1a) = −q∗Z+1a = −
S∑
s=1
π∗s(Zs + a) = −
S∑
s=1
π∗s(Zs)−
S∑
s=1
π∗sa =
= −q∗Z − δa = ρu,ω(Z)− δa.

Note that GE measures of risk are coherent measures of risk under the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 2.15 as well. Interestingly, in Proposition 6, Jaschke and Ku¨chler (2001) presents a similar
result for a family of normalized, non-negative price systems.
As GE measures of risk are coherent and their linearity also implies comonotonic additivity, so
far ﬁve out of six axioms of spectral measures of risk are satisﬁed by them. The sixth one is law
invariance. The following example shows that GE measures of risk are not law invariant.
Example 2.21. As a special case of Example 2.19 consider 2 states of nature at t = 1 with equal
probability of occurrence. Let δ¯ = 1 and α = 1. Two portfolios, X1 and X2, the aggregate
endowment, and the state prices calculated by Equation (2.15) are given in Table 2.3 below.
Let us assume that X1, X2 ∈ V . It is easy to see that Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 have the same probability
distribution. However, ρu,ω(X1) = 0.9 = 1.05 = ρu,ω(X2), so law invariance fails.
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s ps X
1 X2 ω π∗s
0 - - - 0 1
1 0.5 -1 -2 0.2 0.4
2 0.5 -2 -1 0.5 0.25
Table 2.3: A GE measure of risk which is not law invariant.
Note that the two portfolios in Table 2.3 are related differently to the economy. Portfolio X1 is
larger when ω is smaller, whereas X2 is smaller when ω is smaller. Although the two portfolios
have the same mean, X1 is a better hedge against the aggregate uncertainty. That is why the GE
measure of risk of X1 is smaller than the GE measure of risk of X2.
One can easily calculate that in Example 2.21 r1 = 1.5385, and E(rω˜) = 1.7073. Using those
numbers we can apply Equation (2.17) and calculate the GE measures of risk of X1 and X2
through the CAPM formula as it is given in Table 2.4. Note that βX1 is positive, whereas βX2 is
negative.
X1 X2
E(X i) -1.5 -1.5
βXi 0.7593 -0.6508
ρu,ω(X
i) 0.9 1.05
Table 2.4: A GE measure of risk and the CAPM formula.
Most of the GE measures of risk are not law invariant. In Example 2.21 all that is needed is that
the state prices are different, which is the case in a generic economy. The failure of law invariance
tells us that the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment (or market portfolio, in terms of
CAPM) should be taken into account, when calculating the risk of a portfolio. Nevertheless one
can generalize law invariance in such a way that GE measures of risk satisfy them. The point is
to look at the joint distribution of a portfolio and the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment.
Deﬁnition 2.22. A measure of risk ρ : V → R is generalized law invariant if for all X, Y ∈ V
such that for all s = 1, . . . , S
Pr(Xˆ = Xs and ωˆ = ωs) = Pr(Yˆ = Xs and ωˆ = ωs),
we have ρ(X) = ρ(Y ).
Proposition 2.23. GE measures of risk are generalized law invariant.
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Proof. It is easy to see from Equation (2.12) and Deﬁnition 2.18 that any ρu,ω ∈ GV is generali-
zed law invariant. 
2.6 Connections: Spectral and GE Measures of Risk
In this section we show the conditions under which spectral measures of risk as deﬁned in Def-
inition 2.2 are GE measures of risk as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.18. Then we characterize GE
measures of risk.
Deﬁnition 2.24. A vector ω˜ ∈ RS and a set V ⊆ RS are comonotonic if ω˜ and Z are comono-
tonic for every Z ∈ V .
Proposition 2.25 says that all the spectral measures of risk are GE measures of risk if and only if
their domain is comonotonic with the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment, that is all the
vectors in V are comonotonic with ω˜, their values go up and down together event by event.
Proposition 2.25. Assume ω is given and it has different outcomes in states s = 1, . . . , S. More-
over, let V contain S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with ω˜. Then for every
Mφ there exists a GE measure of risk ρu,ω ∈ GV such that
Mφ(Z) = ρu,ω(Z) for all Z ∈ V
if and only if ω˜ and V are comonotonic.
Proof. Since ω˜ has different outcomes in each state of nature by assumption, without loss of
generality we can assume that ω1 < ω2 < · · · < ωS .
(⇐) We show that comonotonicity is sufﬁcient. Take any spectral measure of risk, Mφ and any
Z ∈ V . Since ω˜ and V are comonotonic, ω˜ and Z are also comonotonic. Let us search for a GE
measure of risk ρu,ω ∈ GV satisfying the equation Mφ(Z) = ρu,ω(Z). Since ω is given, the only
freedom is in choosing u ∈ U . Using the deﬁnitions the requirement is
Mφ(Z) = −δ
S∑
s=1
φsZs:S = −δ¯
S∑
s=1
psv
′(ωs)Zs
v′0(ω0)
= ρu,ω(Z). (2.18)
From Equation (2.13) the discount factor is determined as
δ = δ¯
∑S
s=1 psv
′(ωs)
v′0(ω0)
. (2.19)
24 Coherent Measures of Risk from a General Equilibrium Perspective
Using Equation (2.19) and the assumption that p1 = · · · = pS = 1S , Equation (2.18) reads as
−δ¯
∑S
s=1
1
S
v′(ωs)
v′0(ω0)
S∑
s=1
φsZs:S = −δ¯
S∑
s=1
1
S
v′(ωs)Zs
v′0(ω0)
. (2.20)
After simplifying and rearranging, Equation (2.20) leads to
S∑
s=1
φsZs:S =
∑S
s=1 v
′(ωs)Zs∑S
s=1 v
′(ωs)
. (2.21)
In Equation (2.21) two weighted averages of Z should coincide. Since ω˜ and Z are comonotonic,
a larger ω˜ implies a larger or equal Z. Thus the ordered and the non-ordered statistics of Z
coincide, that is Zs:S = Zs for all s = 1, . . . , S. The weights on the left-hand side are by
deﬁnition normalized, nonnegative, and non-increasing. The weights on the right-hand side are
also normalized, and it is easy to see that v can be chosen monotone and concave to obtain the
same weights.
(⇒) We show that comonotonicity is necessary.
By assumption V contains S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with ω˜. Let us
denote them by Z1, . . . , Z S¯ ∈ V , where S¯ = S. Since for all s¯ = 1, . . . , S¯ we have that Z s¯ and
ω˜ and comonotonic, we have that
Z s¯s:S = Z
s¯
s for all s = 1, . . . , S, (2.22)
that is the ordered and the non-ordered statistics of Z s¯ coincide. Since the proposition should
hold for any given Mφ, let us take a spectral measure of risk with different φs in each state of
nature. We show indirectly that if ω˜ and V are not comonotonic, then there is no GE measure of
risk ρu,ω ∈ GV such that Mφ(Z) yields the same number as ρu,ω(Z) for all Z ∈ V .
If Mφ(Z s¯) yields the same number as ρu,ω(Z s¯) for s¯ = 1, . . . , S¯, then using the logic of Equation
(2.21) and the result in Equation (2.22) the following equations are satisﬁed:
S∑
s=1
φsZ
s¯
s =
∑S
s=1 v
′(ωs)Z
s¯
s∑S
s=1 v
′(ωs)
for s¯ = 1, . . . , S¯. (2.23)
As the equations in (2.23) are homogeneous, we can assume that∑Ss=1 v′(ωs) = 1. Since the
vectors Z1, . . . , Z S¯ are linearly independent, the equations in (2.23) determine that
v′(ωs) = φs for s = 1, . . . , S. (2.24)
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Now take any Z ∈ V which is not comonotonic with ω˜ (such Z exists since ω˜ and V are not
comonotonic). It follows from the deﬁnition of comonotonicity that there exist states of nature
s1 and s2 in which
ωs1 < ωs2 but Zs1 > Zs2. (2.25)
Using Equation (2.21) and Equation (2.24) we get that Mφ(Z) = ρu,ω(Z) if and only if
S∑
s=1
φsZs:S =
S∑
s=1
φsZs. (2.26)
Both sides of Equation (2.26) are weighted averages of Z. The left-hand side assigns strictly
decreasing weights to the ordered statistics of Z. The right-hand side assigns the same weights
but due to the observation in (2.25) at least one higher outcome of Z gets a higher weight, leading
to
S∑
s=1
φsZs:S <
S∑
s=1
φsZs. (2.27)
We have a contradiction. 
Note that we had to assume in Proposition 2.25 that ω˜ has different outcomes in each state of
nature. In a generic economy this assumption is satisﬁed. The second assumption was that V
contains S linearly independent vectors which are comonotonic with ω˜. It is easy to check that
this assumption is satisﬁed if V contains all the vectors which are comonotonic with ω˜ or if V
contains a convex cone generated by ω˜ and S − 1 linearly independent vectors. However, if we
only require that V contains ω˜, then Proposition 2.25 cannot be proven as the following example
shows.
Example 2.26. Suppose V = {ω˜, Z}, where ω˜ and Z are given in Table 2.5 below.
s ω˜s Zs
1 1 -2
2 2 -1
3 3 -1.25
Table 2.5: Z is not comonotonic with ω˜.
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Note that the vector ω˜ and V are not comonotonic in Table 2.5, since Z ∈ V is not comonotonic
with ω˜. We show that in this example for every Mφ there exists a GE measure of risk ρu,ω ∈ GV
such that Mφ(Z) = ρu,ω(Z) for all Z ∈ V , although ω˜ and V are not comonotonic. Using the
normalized version of Equation (2.21) we have that Mφ and ρu,ω lead to the same number for ω˜
if
φ1 + 2φ2 + 3φ3 = v
′(ω˜1) + 2v
′(ω˜2) + 3v
′(ω˜3), and for Z if (2.28)
−2φ1 − 1.25φ2 − φ3 = −2v
′(ω˜1)− v
′(ω˜2)− 1.25v
′(ω˜3). (2.29)
Moreover, we know that
φ1 + φ2 + φ3 = v
′(ω˜1) + v
′(ω˜2) + v
′(ω˜3) = 1, and by deﬁnition (2.30)
φ1 ≥ φ2 ≥ φ3. (2.31)
Solving the Equations (2.28), (2.29) and (2.30) leads to the unique solution
v′(ω˜1) = φ1 +
1
5
φ2 −
1
5
φ3, (2.32)
v′(ω˜2) =
3
5
φ2 +
2
5
φ3, (2.33)
v′(ω˜3) =
1
5
φ2 +
4
5
φ3. (2.34)
Since v is assumed to be concave,
v′(ω˜1) ≥ v
′(ω˜2) ≥ v
′(ω˜3) should hold. (2.35)
From Equation (2.31) we have that φ2 ≥ φ3. This observation implies with Equation (2.32) that
v′(ω˜1) ≥ φ1; with Equations (2.33), (2.34) that v′(ω˜2) ≥ v′(ω˜3); and with Equation (2.33) that
v′(ω˜2) ≤ φ2. Since φ1 ≥ φ2 from Equation (2.31) the inequalities in Equation (2.35) are clearly
satisﬁed.
The strong requirement in Proposition 2.25 is that ω˜ and V should be comonotonic to represent
all the spectral measures of risk by GE measures of risk. In this case all the vectors in V are
dependent in the strongest form on the stochastic part of the aggregate endowment, their value
should always go up and down together event by event. The larger the number of states S, the
more stringent this assumption is.
We can characterize the set of GE measures of risk as follows.
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Deﬁnition 2.27. A measure of risk ρ : V → R satisﬁes the pricing kernel property on V if there
exists a vector γ ∈ RS+ such that for all Z ∈ V we have that
ρ(Z) = −
S∑
s=1
psγsZs. (2.36)
The vector γ is interpreted as the pricing kernel, and the measure of risk of portfolio Z is the
negative of its price, induced by the pricing kernel. Let us denote by PV the set of risk measures
satisfying the pricing kernel property on V . Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.28. The set of GE measures of risk on V coincides with the set of risk measures
satisfying the pricing kernel property on V, thus GV = PV .
Proof.
GV ⊆ PV
For any ρu,ω ∈ GV , by Equation (2.14) we have that
ρu,ω(Z) = −
S∑
s=1
π∗sZs. (2.37)
By Proposition 2.16, π∗ ∈ RS+. Using the notation γs = π∗s/ps, s = 1, . . . , S, Equation (2.37)
can be rewritten as
ρu,ω(Z) = −
S∑
s=1
psγsZs, γ ∈ R
S
+, (2.38)
thus ρu,ω satisﬁes the pricing kernel property.
GV ⊇ PV
Let us take any measure of risk ρ¯ ∈ PV satisfying the pricing kernel property on V . By deﬁnition
there exists a vector γ ∈ RS+ such that for all Z ∈ V we have that
ρ¯(Z) = −
S∑
s=1
psγsZs. (2.39)
We show that there exist a quadratic utility function u and endowment ω ∈ RS+1 such that for
all Z ∈ V we have that ρ¯(Z) = ρu,ω(Z). Let v0(c0) = c0 − 12αc
2
0 and v(cs) = cs − 12αc
2
s for
s = 1, . . . , S. In equilibrium c∗ = ω. We know from Equation (2.15) that
ρu,ω(Z) = −δ¯
∑S
s=1 psv
′(ωs)Zs
v′0(ω0)
= −δ¯
∑S
s=1 ps(1− αωs)Zs
(1− αω0)
. (2.40)
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Let α = 1, δ¯ = 1 and ω0=0. Then Equation (2.40) simpliﬁes to
ρu,ω(Z) = −
S∑
s=1
ps(1− ωs)Zs. (2.41)
By setting ωs such that γs = (1− ωs), s = 1, . . . , S, Equation (2.39) and Equation (2.41) deﬁne
the same measure of risk. As v′0 = 1 and v′s = γs, s = 1, . . . , S, the monotonicity requirements
of the elementary utility functions are satisﬁed. 
Thus GE measures of risk are the only measures of risk satisfying the pricing kernel prop-
erty. They are linear functions induced by S nonnegative parameters (γ1, . . . , γS). On the other
hand spectral measures of risk are piecewise linear functions, also induced by S parameters
(φ1, . . . , φS), which are applied to the ordered statistics of the portfolio’s payoff vector. Thus,
although the cardinalities of their sets are the same, under some technical assumptions spectral
measures of risk are GE measures of risk if and only if the orderings of all the portfolio vectors
are the same as the ordering of the market portfolio.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed coherent and spectral measures of risk from a general equilibrium
(GE) perspective. Coherent measures of risk can be deﬁned by four axioms: monotonicity, sub-
additivity, positive homogeneity, translation invariance. Adding two more axioms, law invariance
and comonotonic additivity leads to spectral measures of risk. We considered the discrete setting
and a general domain V ⊆ RS . We proved that it is also true in the discrete setting with unre-
stricted domain, that is if V = RS that spectral measures of risk are the only coherent measures
of risk satisfying law invariance and comonotonic additivity. However, we have shown examples
where on a general domain V this may not hold.
We deﬁned a natural measure of risk coming out of a general equilibrium model. The GE mea-
sure of risk of a portfolio is the negative of its equilibrium market price. Checking the properties
of GE measures of risk enabled us to assess the above mentioned six axioms. We found that
GE measures of risk are coherent measures of risk. This way the four axioms of coherent mea-
sures of risk are supported from a general equilibrium perspective. Thus Value at Risk and other
non-coherent risk measures cannot be associated with our general equilibrium framework.
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However, GE measures of risk do not satisfy law invariance, but only a generalized version of it,
in which the market portfolio is also taken into account. Since spectral measures of risk are law
invariant, we can conclude that in general, when calculating the risk of a regulated entity, spectral
measures of risk do not take into account its relation to the market portfolio, leading to an under-
or overestimation of risk. The same idea is shown by our result that spectral measures of risk
are GE measures of risk if and only if all the regulated entities are comonotonic with the market
portfolio, that is their values go up and down together event by event. Finally, we showed that
GE measures of risk are the only measures of risk satisfying the pricing kernel property, which
means that any nonnegative pricing kernel can induce them as the negative of the equilibrium
market price.
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Chapter 3
Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
In this chapter1 we provide two new characterizations of exact games. First, a game is exact if
and only if it is exactly balanced; and second, a game is exact if and only if it is totally balanced
and overbalanced.
The condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that one of
the balancing weights may be negative while for overbalancedness one of the balancing weights
is required to be non-positive and no weight is put on the grand coalition. Exact balancedness
and overbalancedness are both easy to formulate conditions with a natural game-theoretic inter-
pretation and are shown to be useful in applications.
Using exact balancedness we show that exact games are convex for the grand coalition and we
provide an alternative proof that the classes of convex and totally exact games coincide. We
provide an example of a game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but
not exact. Finally we relate classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand coalition,
exact, totally exact, and convex games to one another.
3.1 Introduction
It is well-known that the core in a transferable utility game is non-empty if and only if the game is
balanced (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). The core of every subgame of a transferable utility
game is non-empty if and only if the game is totally balanced. Totally balanced games arise from
a wide range of applications. They coincide with market games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969);
also with a special case of market games with a continuum of indivisible commodities (Legut,
1This chapter is based on Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007a).
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1990); they are equivalent to a class of maximum ﬂow problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982a); and
also to permutation games of less than four players (Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Prassad,
1984). Moreover, totally balanced games are generated by linear production games (Owen,
1975), generalized network problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982b), and controlled mathematical
programming problems (Dubey and Shapley, 1984).
In this chapter we provide a set of linear programming problems to study a subclass of totally
balanced games, exact games (Schmeidler, 1972). By the linear programming problems one can
easily check whether a game is exact or not. Using the dual of the problems we develop two
new characterizations of exact games complementing those by Schmeidler (1972) and Azrieli
and Lehrer (2005).
The ﬁrst characterization of the class of exact games is the condition of exact balancedness. One
interpretation of balancedness is that the players can distribute one unit of working time to any
coalition and in doing so cannot generate more value than the grand coalition. The condition of
exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that players in one coalition
are allowed to work overtime in any combination of the coalitions, but their best choice is to stick
to their original coalition. We show that exact balancedness implies total balancedness.
The second characterization spells out what more than total balancedness is needed to obtain
exactness. It says that a game is exact if an only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced. In
case of overbalancedness, no weight is put on the grand coalition and one coalition works a non-
negative amount of overtime. From this characterization it follows immediately that an exact
game is totally balanced.
The simplicity of our balancedness conditions is helpful in applications. In Chapter 4 we will use
total balancedness and overbalancedness to show that risk allocation games with no aggregate
uncertainty are exact. Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) show that totally
exact games are convex (and that convex games are totally exact). Using exact balancedness we
provide an alternative proof of this result.
We also study games that are convex for the grand coalition, where convexity is only required
for coalitions whose union is the set of all players. We show that exact balancedness implies that
a game is convex for the grand coalition, which leads to the result that exact games in case of
less than four players are convex. Using the intuition behind exact balancedness, we provide an
example of a game which is both totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but which
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is not exact.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We start with the notation and the necessary deﬁni-
tions. In Section 3.3 we study the balancedness conditions for exact games. In Section 3.4 we
demonstrate the usefulness of our characterizations of exact games. We conclude the chapter
with a summary of how the classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand coalition,
exact, totally exact, and convex games are related to one another.
3.2 Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a ﬁnite set of players, N is the collection of non-empty subsets
of N, and D is the collection of non-empty subsets of a coalition D ∈ N . A value function
v : 2N → R satisfying that v(∅) = 0 gives rise to a cooperative game with transferable utility
(game, for short) (N, v). Let Γ denote the set of games with n players. An allocation is a vector
x ∈ Rn, where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N . For a coalition C ∈ N , let x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi. An
allocation x ∈ Rn is called efﬁcient if x(N) = v(N), individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all
i ∈ N, and coalitionally rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ N . The core is the set of efﬁcient
and coalitionally rational allocations.
For each C ∈ N , a(C) ∈ Rn is the membership vector in C, where ai(C) = 1 if i ∈ C and
ai(C) = 0 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A balanced vector of weights is (λC)C∈N such that λC ∈ R+ and∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N). A game (N, v) is balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N) for all bal-
anced vectors of weights (λC)C∈N .
Let Γb denote the class of balanced games with n players. A well-known interpretation of bal-
ancedness is that if the players distribute one unit of working time to any coalition and each
coalition is active during λC time units, then the players cannot generate more value than v(N),
the value of the grand coalition. Balancedness is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the core
in a transferable utility game to be non-empty (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967).
For a game (N, v) and a coalition D ∈ N the subgame (D, vD) is obtained by restricting v to
subsets of D.
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Deﬁnition 3.2. A game (N, v) is totally balanced if for every D ∈ N its subgame (D, vD)
is balanced, that is, if for all D ∈ N and for all vectors (λC)C∈D such that λC ∈ R+ and∑
C∈D λCa(C) = a(D), we have
∑
C∈D λCv(C) ≤ v(D).
In a totally balanced game every subgame has a non-empty core. Let Γtb denote the class of
totally balanced games with n players.
Schmeidler (1972) introduces exact games.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A game (N, v) is exact if for each C ∈ 2N there exists a core allocation x such
that x(C) = v(C).
Let Γe denote the class of exact games with n players.
Deﬁnition 3.4. A game (N, v) is convex if for all S, T ∈ 2N we have v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T )+
v(S ∩ T ).
Let Γc denote the class of convex games with n players. Convex games are exact (Schmeidler,
1972). We now introduce the new notion of convexity for the grand coalition.
Deﬁnition 3.5. A game (N, v) is convex for the grand coalition if for all S, T ∈ 2N such that
S ∪ T = N we have v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N) + v(S ∩ T ).
Let Γcg denote the set of games which are convex for the grand coalition.
Following Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999), we deﬁne totally exact games
analogously to totally balanced games.
Deﬁnition 3.6. A game (N, v) is totally exact if for every D ∈ N its subgame (D, vD) is exact.
Let Γte denote the class of totally exact games with n players.
3.3 Exact Games and Balancedness
Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γ. For each coalition D ∈ N we develop a linear programming
problem related to the game (N, v). The linear program is such that whenever (N, v) is exact,
any optimal solution x∗ is a core allocation satisfying x∗(D) = v(D). We denote the linear
program by Pv,D and its dual by P∗v,D.
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min a(N)x max
∑
C∈N λCv(C)
s. t. s. t.
(Pv,D) a(C)x ≥ v(C), C ∈ N \ {D} (P∗v,D)
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N)
a(D)x = v(D) λC ∈ R+, C ∈ N \ {D}
x ∈ Rn λD ∈ R.
Let us discuss the primal. The ﬁrst part of the feasibility constraints requires that x is coalitionally
rational for all coalitions but coalition D. The second part of the feasibility constraints requires
that x(D) = v(D), that is, x should be efﬁcient in the subgame (D, vD), so a feasible solution
yields a core element in the subgame (D, vD).
If (D, vD) is a balanced game, then the set of feasible solutions is non-empty. In this case, the
subgame (D, vD) has a core element and the other elements of a feasible solution can be chosen
sufﬁciently large. In this case the set of optimal solutions of (Pv,D) is also non-empty since the set
of feasible solutions is bounded from below. If (D, vD) is not balanced, then the set of feasible
solutions of (Pv,D) is empty, since then (D, vD) has no core allocations. If x∗ is an optimal
solution of the primal, then ov,D = a(N)x∗ is the value of the optimal solution, which by the
duality theorem of linear programming is the same as the optimal objective value of the dual. If
(Pv,D) has no optimal solutions, then we deﬁne ov,D = ∞. The linear programming problems are
related to exactness as follows.
Proposition 3.7. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N we have that
ov,D = v(N).
Proof.
(⇒) Take any exact game (N, v) ∈ Γe and a coalition D ∈ N . Any feasible solution to (Pv,D) has
an objective value greater than or equal to v(N). As (N, v) is exact there exists a core element x∗
such that x∗(D) = v(D) and x∗(N) = v(N). The vector x∗ satisﬁes the feasibility constraints
of (Pv,D) and has objective value a(N)x∗ = v(N).
(⇐) Assume that for each D ∈ N the value of the optimal solution is v(N). Let x∗ be an optimal
solution of (Pv,D), so a(N)x∗ = v(N), that is x∗ is efﬁcient. The efﬁciency and the feasibility
constraints imply that x∗ is a core allocation of (N, v) with x(D) = v(D). Thus (N, v) is exact.

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Let us continue by analyzing the dual, (P∗v,D). It holds that ov,D = v(N) if and only if for all
feasible solutions of (P∗v,D) the value of the objective function is not larger than v(N). Using
this observation, Proposition 3.7, and the linear programming problems we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.8. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N and for each vector
(λC)C∈N such that for C ∈ N \ {D}, λC ∈ R+, λD ∈ R, and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N) we have∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N).
In Theorem 3.11 below, we rewrite the conditions in Corollary 3.8 using exact balancedness,
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.9. An exactly balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈N such that for some
D ∈ N , λD ∈ R, for C = D, λC ∈ R+, and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N). A game (N, v) is exactly
balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N) for all exactly balanced vectors of weights.
Notice that the only difference to the condition of balancedness is that one weight, λD, can be
arbitrary (negative, zero, or positive). If λD < 0, then we can interpret |λD| as the amount of time
members of coalition D work in overtime. As an illustration, consider the following example.
Example 3.10. Take a game (N, v) with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. By deﬁning λ{1} =
1, λ{2} = 1, λ{1,3} = 1, λ{2,4} = 1, λ{1,2} = −1 and by setting all other balancing weights to
zero, we obtain an exactly balanced vector of weights, since
a({1}) + a({2}) + a({1, 3}) + a({2, 4})− a({1, 2}) = a({1, 2, 3, 4}). (3.1)
For exact balancedness
v({1}) + v({2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 4})− v({1, 2}) ≤ v({1, 2, 3, 4}) (3.2)
should hold, which can be written alternatively as
v({1}) + v({2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 4}) ≤ v({1, 2, 3, 4}) + v({1, 2}). (3.3)
Equation (3.1) can be interpreted as follows. Players in the coalition with the negative weight,
here coalition {1, 2}, work overtime, each member of {1, 2} allocating a total amount of −λ{1,2}
extra time units among the coalitions {1}, {2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 4}, so player 1 spends −λ{1,2}
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extra time units in coalitions {1} and {1, 3}, and player 2 in coalitions {2} and {2, 4}. Equation
(3.3) says that the total value generated in doing so cannot exceed the value of working one unit
of time in the grand coalition and −λ{1,2} time units of overtime in coalition {1, 2}. Equiva-
lently, Equation (3.2) says that the total value generated in doing so with the opportunity cost of
this extra effort −λ{1,2}v{1,2} subtracted, the players cannot generate more value than the grand
coalition.
Exact balancedness requires that the value of the coalition having the option to work overtime
should be sufﬁciently large. Since in an exactly balanced vector of weights the weight of any
coalition can be negative, exact balancedness implies that the value of each coalition sufﬁciently
large for there to be core elements in which the coalition gets its stand alone value.
Exact balancedness is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a game to be exact.
Theorem 3.11. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced.
Proof. This follows immediately from Corollary 3.8. 
Exact games can also be characterized by total balancedness and overbalancedness, to be deﬁned
next.
Deﬁnition 3.12. An overbalanced vector of weights is a vector (μC)C∈N\{N} such that μC ∈ R+
and
∑
C∈N\{D,N} μCa(C) = a(N) + μDa(D) for some D ∈ N . A game (N, v) is overbalanced
if
∑
C∈N\{D,N} μCv(C) ≤ v(N) + μDv(D) for all overbalanced vectors of weights.
The difference between balancedness and overbalancedness is that in the case of overbalanced-
ness, no weight is put on the grand coalition and the members of one coalition are forced to
work a non-negative amount of overtime. As in Equation (3.3), the overbalancedness condition
requires that working one unit of time for the grand coalition and a non-negative amount of over-
time in coalition D generates at least the same value as any allocation of the same amount of
time to work in the other coalitions.
Theorem 3.13. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced.
Proof. We show that a game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exactly balanced if and only if it is totally balanced
and overbalanced.
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(⇒) Total balancedness of (N, v) follows almost immediately by the deﬁnition of exactness, or
one obtains it using exact balancedness as follows. For D ∈ N \{N} balancedness of (D, vD) is
obtained by setting the exactly balanced weights such that λN = 1 and λD = −1. Balancedness
of (N, v) is obtained by considering exactly balanced vectors of weights where all the weights
are non-negative.
Using exactly balanced vectors of weights with λN = 0 and λD ≤ 0 implies overbalancedness
of (N, v).
(⇐) Take any exactly balanced vector of weights (λC)C∈N with λD ∈ R, λC ∈ R+ for C ∈
N \ {D}, and
∑
C∈N
λCa(C) = a(N). (3.4)
It follows immediately that λN ≤ 1. We discuss two cases depending on the value of λN .
1. λN < 1. In this case (3.4) can be rearranged as
∑
C∈N\{N}
λC
1− λN
a(C) = a(N). (3.5)
If λD ≤ 0, then exact balancedness is implied by overbalancedness of (N, v), otherwise
by balancedness of (N, v).
2. λN = 1. If λD ≥ 0, then exact balancedness is trivially satisﬁed since now λN = 1 and
(3.4) implies (λC)C∈N\{N} = 0. If λD < 0, then (3.4) can be rearranged as
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
λC
−λD
a(C) = a(D), (3.6)
and exact balancedness follows from total balancedness of (N, v).

Theorem 3.13 characterizes exact games as being the class of totally balanced and overbalanced
games. It follows immediately that an exact game is totally balanced, which was also shown
by Schmeidler (1972). Further, the result shows that exact games are not only totally balanced,
but also satisfy the extra condition of overbalancedness, where no weight is put on the grand
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coalition and one weight should be non-positive when checking the “normal” balancedness of
the game.
In Derks and Reijnierse (1998), Theorem 7, the characterization of exact games by Schmeidler
(1972), is formulated as follows.
Theorem 3.14. (Schmeidler, 1972) A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N \
{N}, for each vector (γC)C∈N such that γC ∈ R+ and
∑
C∈N\{N} γCa(C) = a(D) + γNa(N)
we have
∑
C∈N\{N} γCv(C) ≤ v(D) + γNv(N).
To clarify the differences, we provide a direct proof of the equivalence of Schmeidler’s charac-
terization of exactness and the characterization in Theorem 3.13.
Proposition 3.15. A game (N, v) ∈ Γ satisﬁes the conditions in Theorem 3.14 if and only if it is
totally balanced and overbalanced.
Proof.
(⇒) That (D, vD) is balanced for D ∈ N \ {N} follows by setting γN = 0. Balancedness of
(N, v) follows from weights such that γN = 1 and γD ≥ 1. Overbalanced weights satisfy the
equality
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
μCa(C) = a(N) + μDa(D). (3.7)
The case where μD = 0 follows from Schmeidler’s characterization with γN = 1 and γD = 1. In
case μD > 0, (3.7) is equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
μC
μD
a(C) =
1
μD
a(N) + a(D).
It is now easily seen that this case is implied by Schmeidler’s characterization when we choose
γD = 0, γN = 1/μD, and γC = μC/μD for C ∈ N \ {D,N}.
(⇐) The balancing weights of Schmeidler satisfy
∑
C∈N\{N}
γCa(C) = a(D) + γNa(N). (3.8)
In this case Schmeidler’s condition is
∑
C∈N\{N} γCv(C) ≤ v(D) + γNv(N). If γN = 0, then
balancedness of (D, vD) gives rise to Schmeidler’s condition. If γN > 0 and γD ≥ 1, then (3.8)
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is equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
γC
γN
a(C) +
γD − 1
γN
a(D) = a(N),
and Schmeidler’s condition follows from balancedness. If γN > 0 and γD < 1, then (3.8) is
equivalent to
∑
C∈N\{D,N}
γC
γN
a(C) = a(N) +
1− γD
γN
a(D),
so Schmeidler’s condition follows from overbalancedness. 
For a coalition C ∈ N let |C| denote the number of players involved in the coalition. Azrieli and
Lehrer (2005) give the following necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for exactness.
Theorem 3.16. (Azrieli and Lehrer, 2005, Proposition 2) A game (N, v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only
if for every D ∈ N , for each vector (αC)C∈N such that αC ∈ R+,
∑
C∈N αC = 1, β ∈ [0, 1] and∑
C∈N αC
a(C)
|C|
= β a(D)
|D|
+ (1− β)a(N)
|N |
we have
∑
C∈N αC
v(C)
|C|
≤ β v(D)
|D|
+ (1− β)v(N)
|N |
.
Notice that in Theorem 3.16 if D = N , we have the usual balancedness condition expressed
in terms of average worth, that is when distributing one unit of working time to the coalitions,
players cannot generate more value per person than in the grand coalition.
In a similar way as in the proof of Proposition 3.15, one can show that the characterization
by Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) is equivalent to the characterization by total balancedness and
overbalancedness.
Of all the characterizations presented, exact balancedness is closest to balancedness. In fact, the
only difference is that in exact balancedness one of the balancing weights can be chosen to be
negative. The characterization of exact games as the ones that satisfy total balancedness and
overbalancedness spells out what more than total balancedness is needed to obtain exactness.
3.4 Applications of Exact Balancedness
In Chapter 4 we will use the characterization of exact games as those that are totally balanced
and overbalanced to show that risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty are exact.
In this section we show how the condition of exact balancedness (Deﬁnition 3.9) can be used
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to show the relationships between the various classes of games deﬁned in Section 3.2. First we
demonstrate that exact games are convex for the grand coalition (Deﬁnition 3.5) and that the class
of totally exact games (Deﬁnition 3.6) coincides with the class of convex games (Deﬁnition 3.4).
Then we discuss games with less than four players, where exact games turn out to be convex.
Finally, we present an example of a game with four players that is totally balanced, convex for
the grand coalition, but not exact.
Proposition 3.17. If the game (N, v) is exact, then it is convex for the grand coalition, Γe ⊆ Γcg.
Proof. Take two coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S∪T = N . LetD = S∩T . Since (N, v) is exact,
by Theorem 3.11 it is exactly balanced. We deﬁne an exactly balanced vector of weights by set-
ting λS = 1, λT = 1, and λD = −1. All other balancing weights are set to zero. Notice that this
constitutes an exactly balanced vector of weights, since a(S) + a(T )− a(D) = a(N). By exact
balancedness we have that v(S)+v(T )−v(D) ≤ v(N), that is v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(N)+v(S∩T ). 
Theorem 3.18. A game is totally exact if and only if it is convex, Γte = Γc.
Proof.
(⇒) Since by Proposition 3.17 exact games are convex for the grand coalition, totally exact
games are convex for all coalitions, that is they are convex.
(⇐) It is known that convex games are exact (Schmeidler, 1972). Since a subgame of a convex
game is also convex, we have total exactness. 
The following result claims that a game with less than four players that is totally balanced and
convex for the grand coalition has to be convex.
Proposition 3.19. Assume that there are less than four players. If the game (N, v) is totally
balanced and convex for the grand coalition, then it is convex.
Proof. For one or two player games the claim requires no proof. Consider the case with three
players. For coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∪T = N convexity follows from the convexity for
the grand coalition. When S ∩ T = ∅, S ∪ T = C, where C is a two-player coalition, convexity
follows from total balancedness. When S ⊆ T , where T is a two-player coalition, convexity
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follows since S ∩ T = S and S ∪ T = T . 
Exact games are totally balanced (Theorem 3.13) and convex for the grand coalition (Proposition
3.17): Γe ⊆ Γtb∩Γcg. Since a convex game is exact, using Proposition 3.19 we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.20. Assume that there are less than four players. Then a game is exact if and only
if it is convex.
There exist games that are convex for the grand coalition, but that are not totally balanced, and
games that are totally balanced, but not convex for the grand coalition, so Γtb ∩ Γcg  Γcg and
Γtb∩Γcg  Γtb. Theorem 3.13 and Proposition 3.17 imply that Γe ⊆ Γtb∩Γcg. We consider next
the question whether there are games that are totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition,
but not exact. Using the intuition behind exact balancedness we provide an example of such a
game, thus we have that Γe  Γtb ∩ Γcg.
Example 3.21. We present a game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition,
but not exact. By Proposition 3.19 we need at least four players. Consider the following game
with four players. Let
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = 0,
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3}) = v({2, 4}) = v({3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 2.
The game (N, v) is totally balanced, since every subgame (C, vC) with C containing player 1 has
a core element where player 1 receives v(C) and the other players nothing, and the zero vector is a
core element of all other subgames. The game (N, v) is convex for the grand coalition as v(N) =
2 weakly exceeds the sum of the value of any other two coalitions. We show that the game (N, v)
is not exactly balanced. Let D = {1} and consider the weights λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{1,4} =
1, λ{1} = −2, and set all other weights equal to zero. These weights constitute an exactly
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balanced vector of weights, since a({1, 2}) + a({1, 3}) + a({1, 4})− 2a({1}) = a({1, 2, 3, 4}).
However, v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4})− 2v({1}) = 3 > 2 = v({1, 2, 3, 4}), thus v is not
exact.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided two new characterizations of exact games using linear pro-
gramming formulations. The ﬁrst characterization of exactness is by exact balancedness. The
condition of exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that exactly one
of the weights is allowed to be negative. Using the usual interpretation of balancedness, this is
equivalent to saying that players are allowed to work overtime in a particular coalition.
The second one says that a game is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and overbalanced.
The condition of overbalancedness requires one coalition to work a non-negative amount of
overtime.
By applying exact balancedness we have shown that the class of totally exact games (Γte) coin-
cides with the class of convex games (Γc). We have also proven that with less than four players
the class of exact games coincides with the class of convex games.
Our characterization of exact games by total balancedness and overbalancedness implies that an
exact game is totally balanced (Γtb), and we have shown that exact balancedness implies that an
exact game is convex for the grand coalition (Γcg). Finally, we have provided an example of a
game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but not exact. The relationships
between the various classes of games are summarized in Figure 3.1.
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Γte = Γc
Γe
Γtb ∩ Γcg
Γtb
Γb
Figure 3.1: Subsets of balanced games.
Chapter 4
Stable Allocations of Risk
The measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management.
Coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem. In an envi-
ronment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios’ realization vectors, risk
allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversiﬁcation ben-
eﬁts of the various portfolios? Understanding these cooperative games helps us to ﬁnd stable,
efﬁcient, and fair allocations of risk.
In this chapter1 we show that the class of risk allocation and totally balanced games coincide,
hence a stable allocation of risk is always possible. When the aggregate portfolio is riskless,
the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of exact games. As in exact games
any subcoalition may be subject to marginalization even in core allocations, our result further
emphasizes the responsibility involved in allocating risk.
4.1 Introduction
The value of an investment portfolio is subject to all kinds of uncertain events. Firms, banks,
or insurance companies (to which we refer by the term portfolios) face risk and regulators may
require them to hold cash reserves as a cushion against default – this rather unfavorable state of
nature – with the precise amounts determined by a measure of risk. A measure of risk thereby
speciﬁes the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent has to add to his portfolio for his risk
to be acceptable to the regulator.
The literature knows of numerous possible ways to measure risk; lately interest shifted to coher-
1This chapter is based on Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007c).
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ent measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) deﬁned by four axioms: mono-
tonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and translation invariance. These axioms have been
shown to be compatible with a natural general equilibrium approach to measure risk in Chapter
2.
Of these axioms, subadditivity expresses that the risk of an aggregate portfolio should not exceed
the total risk of the individual subportfolios. In particular, the risk of a ﬁrm is less than the sum
of the risks of the constituents of the ﬁrm. Risk allocation then addresses the distribution of
the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts; risk allocation games (Denault, 2001) are transferable utility games
deﬁned to this purpose.
A risk allocation game assigns to each coalition of portfolios the risk involved in the aggregate
portfolio of the coalition. An allocation shows how to share the risk of the aggregate portfolio
of the grand coalition among the individual portfolios, which has of course consequences on the
cash reserves to be held. The allocation makes clear what part of the risk of a ﬁrm should be
attributed to each of its constituents. A natural question that arises is whether there are stable
allocations of risk, allocations of risk that no coalition can object to, that is whether the core of
the risk allocation game is non-empty.
We separate the risk environment specifying the individual portfolios’ realization vectors of dis-
crete random variables and a coherent measure of risk, a real valued function on the realization
vectors, from the derived cooperative game that we call risk allocation game.
A totally balanced game is a cooperative game having a non-empty core in all of its subgames.
Totally balanced games arise from a wide range of applications. They coincide with market
games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969); also with a special case of market games with a continuum of
indivisible commodities: cooperation in fair division (Legut, 1990); they are equivalent to a class
of maximumﬂow problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982a); and also to permutation games of less than
four players (Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Prassad, 1984). Moreover, totally balanced games
are generated by linear production games (Owen, 1975), generalized network problems (Kalai
and Zemel, 1982b), and controlled mathematical programming problems (Dubey and Shapley,
1984).
We show that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced games,
that is all risk allocation games are totally balanced and all totally balanced games can be gen-
erated by a risk allocation game with a properly speciﬁed risk environment. This result ensures
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that a regulator can always allocate risk in a stable way. No matter how the risk environment
changes, there is always a core element.
We next provide a linear program such that its optimal objective value can be used to determine
whether a given cooperative game is a risk allocation game or not. If the game is a risk allocation
game, then an optimal solution to the linear program yields a risk environment that generates the
game. We then show how to use the linear program to characterize all risk environments that
generate a given totally balanced game.
At last, we focus on games where only the distribution of values is uncertain, while the value of
the aggregate portfolio is constant over all states of nature. This case is relevant for situations
where the risk of the aggregate portfolio is low compared to the risk involved in the individ-
ual portfolios. We show that the class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty
coincides with the class of exact games (Schmeidler, 1972).
The fact that each risk allocation game is exact implies that for each coalition there is a core
element such that the coalition only gets its stand-alone value. This means that in the case
of no aggregate uncertainty, this coalition does not necessarily beneﬁt from the diversiﬁcation
opportunities offered by the aggregate portfolio. As a consequence, the regulator has a high level
of discretion in allocating the risk to the individual portfolios.
As evidenced by the previous paragraphs, there are many applications giving rise to the class
of totally balanced games; to the best of our knowledge, risk allocation with no aggregate un-
certainty is the ﬁrst application that leads to the full class of exact games. However, Calleja,
Borm, and Hendrickx (2005) show that the class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with
the class of non-negative exact games.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First we introduce coherent measures of risk, trans-
ferable utility games, and risk allocation games. In Section 4.3 we prove that the class of risk
allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced games and investigate our con-
structive proof by linear programming. In Section 4.4 we show that the class of risk allocation
games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games. In Section 4.5 we
conclude.
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4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Coherent Measures of Risk
Consider the set RS of realization vectors, where S denotes the number of states of nature. State
of nature s occurs with probability ps > 0 and
∑S
s=1 ps = 1. The vector X ∈ RS represents
a portfolio’s possible proﬁt and loss realizations on a common chosen future time horizon, say
at t = 1. The amount Xs is the portfolio’s payoff in state of nature s. Negative values of Xs
correspond to losses. The inequality Y ≥ X means that Ys ≥ Xs for all s = 1, . . . , S.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → Rmeasuring the risk of a portfolio from the perspective
of the present (t = 0). It is the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent has to add to his
portfolio, and to invest in a reference instrument today, such that it ensures that the risk involved
in the portfolio is acceptable to the regulator. We assume that the reference instrument has payoff
1 in each state of nature at t = 1, thus its realization vector is 1S = (1, . . . , 1). The reference
instrument is riskless in the “classical sense,” having no uncertainty in its payoffs. It is most
natural to think of it as a zero coupon bond. The price of the reference instrument is denoted
by δ ∈ R+, where R+ = [0,∞). We adjust the deﬁnition of coherent measures of risk to the
discrete case with realization vectors as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A function ρ : RS → R is called a coherent measure of risk (Artzner et al.,
1999) if it satisﬁes the following axioms.
1. Monotonicity: for all X, Y ∈ RS such that Y ≥ X , we have ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity: for all X, Y ∈ RS , we have ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity: for all X ∈ RS and h ∈ R+, we have ρ(hX) = hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ RS and a ∈ R, we have ρ(X + a1S) = ρ(X)− δa.
Acerbi (2002) treats a subclass of coherent measures of risk: spectral measures of risk. The
deﬁnition of spectral measures of risk with equiprobable outcomes, that is p1 = · · · = pS = 1/S,
is as follows.
Let us introduce the ordered statistics Xs:S given by the ordered values of the S-tuple
X1, . . . , XS , that is {X1:S, . . . , XS:S} = {X1, . . . , XS} and X1:S ≤ X2:S ≤ · · · ≤ XS:S.
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Deﬁnition 4.2. Let the outcomes be equiprobable. Consider a vector φ ∈ RS . The measure of
risk Mφ : RS → R deﬁned by
Mφ(X) = −δ
S∑
s=1
φsXs:S (4.1)
is a spectral measure of risk if φ ∈ RS satisﬁes the conditions
1. Nonnegativity: φs ≥ 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S,
2. Normalization:
∑S
s=1 φs = 1,
3. Monotonicity : φs is non-increasing, that is φs1 ≥ φs2 if s1 < s2 and s1, s2 ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Spectral measures of risk are discounted weighted average losses, with non-increasing weights,
with the highest weight on the worst outcome. The weight vector φ is the so-called risk spectrum,
the “attitude” toward risk. An important example of a spectral measure of risk is the k-expected
shortfall.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let the outcomes be equiprobable and let k ∈ {1, . . . , S}. The k-expected short-
fall of the realization vector X is deﬁned by
ESk(X) = −δ
k∑
s=1
1
k
Xs:S. (4.2)
The k-expected shortfall is the discounted average of the worst k outcomes. For a detailed
discussion see Acerbi and Tasche (2002).
4.2.2 Transferable Utility Games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a ﬁnite set of players. A value function v : 2N → R with v({∅}) = 0
gives rise to a cooperative game with transferable utility (game, for short) (N, v). Let Γ denote
the set of games with n players. An allocation is a vector x ∈ Rn, where xi is the payoff of player
i ∈ N . An allocation x yields payoff x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi to a coalition C ∈ 2N . An allocation
x ∈ Rn is called efﬁcient, if x(N) = v(N); individually rational, if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N,
and coalitionally rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ 2N . The core is the set of efﬁcient and
coalitionally rational allocations.
For each C ∈ 2N let a(C) ∈ Rn be the membership vector, ai(C) = 1 for i ∈ C and ai(C) = 0
otherwise.
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Deﬁnition 4.4. A balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈2N ∈ R2N+ such that∑
C∈2N λ
Ca(C) = a(N). A game (N, v) is balanced if
∑
C∈2N λ
Cv(C) ≤ v(N) for all bal-
anced vectors of weights.
A well-known interpretation of balancedness is that the players can distribute one unit of working
time to any coalition and if each coalition is active during a fraction λC of a unit of time then the
players cannot generate more value than v(N), the value of the grand coalition. Balancedness is
a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for non-emptiness of the core in a transferable utility game
(Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). See Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) for an extension of
the concept of balancedness to be necessary and sufﬁcient for non-emptiness of the core in non-
transferable utility games.
For a game (N, v) and a coalition C ∈ 2N , a subgame (C, vC) is obtained by restricting v to
subsets of C.
Deﬁnition 4.5. A game (N, v) is totally balanced if for everyD ∈ 2N its subgame (D, vD) is bal-
anced, that is, if for all D ∈ 2N and for all vectors (λC)C∈2D ∈ R2
D
+ satisfying
∑
C∈2D λ
Ca(C) =
a(D), we have
∑
C∈2D λ
Cv(C) ≤ v(D).
In a totally balanced game every subgame has a non-empty core. Let Γtb denote the family of
totally balanced games with n players. An interesting subclass of totally balanced games is the
class of exact games (Schmeidler, 1972).
Deﬁnition 4.6. A game (N, v) is exact if for each C ∈ 2N there exists a core allocation x such
that x(C) = v(C).
Schmeidler (1972) characterizes exact games as follows (see also Derks and Reijnierse (1998),
Theorem 7).
Theorem 4.7. A game (N, v) is exact if and only if for all D ∈ 2N \ {N} and for all vectors
(γC)C∈2N ∈ R
2N
+ satisfying
∑
C∈2N\{N} γ
Ca(C) = γNa(N)+a(D),we have
∑
C∈2N \{N} γ
Cv(C)
≤ γNv(N) + v(D).
In Chapter 3 we have introduced the concept of overbalancedness.
Deﬁnition 4.8. An overbalanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈2N ∈ R2N+ such that∑
C∈2N\{D,N} λ
Ca(C)− λDa(D) = a(N) for some D ∈ 2N . A game (N, v) is overbalanced if∑
C∈2N\{D,N} λ
Cv(C)− λDv(D) ≤ v(N) for all overbalanced vectors of weights.
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A natural interpretation of overbalancedness is that if one coalition is forced to exist for a non-
positive amount of time (−λD ≤ 0), which requires its players to spend (1 + λD) units of time
in the other coalitions, the players cannot generate more value than v(N).
Let Γe denote the family of exact games with n players. In Chapter 3 we gave the following
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a game to be exact as an alternative to the conditions of
Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 4.9. The game (N, v) belongs to Γe if and only if it is totally balanced and overbal-
anced.
Convex games (Shapley, 1971) are a subset of exact games.
Deﬁnition 4.10. A game (N, v) is convex if for all C,D ∈ 2N we have that
v(C) + v(D) ≤ v(C ∪D) + v(C ∩D).
Let Γc denote the family of convex games with n players. We have that Γ ⊇ Γtb ⊇ Γe ⊇ Γc.
4.2.3 Risk Allocation Games
Denault (2001) introduces risk capital allocation problems: Suppose a ﬁrm has n constituents
and the matrix of their realization vectors is given by X ∈ RS×n.2 The question is how the risk
of the ﬁrm as measured by a coherent measure of risk has to be allocated to its constituents in a
stable way, meaning that the risk allocated to a coalition of constituents does not exceed the risk
of the coalition’s aggregate portfolio.
Let X·i denote the i-th column of X , the realization vector of portfolio i. Let Xs· denote the row
of X corresponding to state of nature s, Xs,i its element at row s and column i, and (Xs,i)i∈D the
row vector corresponding to state of nature s with elements i ∈ D. For a coalition of portfolios
C ∈ 2N , let X(C) =
∑
i∈C X·i and Xs(C) =
∑
i∈C Xs,i.
Denault (2001) assumes that the n-th portfolio equals b ∈ R units of the reference instrument:
X·n = b1
S. We will consider the slightly more general setting where X·n can be any portfolio.
Moreover, we make a distinction between the risk environment and the induced game.
2Denault (2001) uses continuously distributed random variables. We adjust his setting to the more tractable setup
with discrete random variables, resulting in realization vectors.
52 Stable Allocations of Risk
Deﬁnition 4.11. A risk environment is a tuple (N, S, p,X, ρ), where N is the set of portfolios, S
indicates the number of states of nature, p = (p1, . . . , pS) is the vector of realization probabilities
of the various states, X is the matrix of realization vectors, and ρ is a coherent measure of risk.
Deﬁnition 4.12. Given a risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ) a risk allocation game is a game
(N, v), where the value function v : 2N → R is deﬁned by
v(C) = −ρ(X(C)) for all C ∈ 2N . (4.3)
A risk allocation game with n players is induced by the number of states of nature, their probabi-
lity of occurrence, n realization vectors and a coherent measure of risk. Let Γr denote the family
of risk allocation games with n players. In such a game, according to Equation (4.3), the larger
the risk of any subset of portfolios, the lower its value.
If the rows of a matrix of realization vectors sum up to the same number, then there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4.13. A matrix of realization vectors X ∈ RS×n has no aggregate uncertainty if there
exists a number α ∈ R such that X(N) = α1S.
Let Γrnau denote the family of risk allocation games with n players with no aggregate uncertainty.
Obviously, Γrnau ⊆ Γr. We ﬁrst study risk allocation games in general, then with no aggregate
uncertainty.
4.3 Total Balancedness
4.3.1 Risk Allocation Games and Totally Balanced Games
Denault (2001, Theorem 4) shows that the family of risk capital allocation problems is balanced.
As a subgame of a risk allocation game is also a risk allocation game, we can adjust his proof to
show that risk allocation games are totally balanced.
Proposition 4.14. All games (N, v) ∈ Γr are totally balanced, Γr ⊆ Γtb.
Proof. Consider a risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ) inducing the game (N, v). We show that
for any D ∈ 2N , the subgame (D, vD) is balanced. Take any (λC)C∈2D ∈ R2
D
+ such that
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∑
C∈2D λ
Ca(C) = a(D). Then by Equation (4.3) and the positive homogeneity and subaddi-
tivity of ρ we have that
∑
C∈2D
λCvD(C) = −
∑
C∈2D
ρ(λCX(C)) ≤ −ρ(
∑
C∈2D
(
∑
i∈C
λCX·i))
= −ρ(
∑
i∈D
(
∑
C∈2D ,Ci
λCX·i)) = −ρ(
∑
i∈D
X·i) = −ρ(X(D))
= vD(D),
where the last line follows from rearranging the summation and using the fact that we have a
balanced vector of weights. Thus (D, vD) is balanced. 
Not only is it true that all risk allocation games are totally balanced, but also any totally balanced
game can be generated by a risk allocation game. We illustrate Proposition 4.15 and its proof by
Example 4.16.
Proposition 4.15. Each game (N, v) ∈ Γtb is induced by some risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ),
so Γtb ⊆ Γr.
Proof. Take any game (N, v) ∈ Γtb. The zero-normalized value function v0 corresponding to v
is deﬁned by
v0(C) = v(C)−
∑
i∈C
v({i}), C ∈ 2N . (4.4)
It is well-known that (N, v0) ∈ Γtb. Using the singletons with weights 1 it follows from the total
balancedness of v0 that for any C ∈ 2N
0 =
∑
i∈C
v0({i}) ≤ v0(C). (4.5)
Moreover, any C ∈ 2N partitions N into C and N \ C, and using weights 1 on C and N \ C
leads to
v0(C) + v0(N \ C) ≤ v0(N). (4.6)
Using Equations (4.5) and (4.6) we obtain that for any C ∈ 2N
0 ≤ v0(C) ≤ v0(N). (4.7)
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The remainder of the proof is constructive. We specify the risk environment (N, S, p,X0, ρ) as
follows. We introduce a state of nature for all non-empty coalitions of N , so S = 2n−1. We label
states of nature by C,D ∈ 2N \{∅}. We consider equiprobably outcomes, p1 = · · · = pS = 1/S,
and we let ρ be the risk measure equal to the 1-expected shortfall (Deﬁnition 4.3) with δ = 1.
For each state of nature C ∈ 2N \ {∅}, let the row vector X0C· be such that
(X0C,i)i∈C belongs to the core of (C, vC0 ), (4.8)
X0C,i = v0(N), i ∈ N \ C. (4.9)
The risk environment (N, S, p,X0, ρ) induces the game (N, v¯0). We will show that v¯0 = v0.
By the deﬁnition of 1-expected shortfall, we have
v¯0(C) = −ρ(X
0(C)) = min
D∈2N\{∅}
X0D(C), C ∈ 2
N . (4.10)
The deﬁnition of a subgame, Equation (4.8), and the efﬁciency of a core element imply
vC0 (C) = v0(C) = X
0
C(C), C ∈ 2
N \ {∅}. (4.11)
We show next that
X0C(C) ≤ X
0
D(C), C,D ∈ 2
N \ {∅}. (4.12)
Indeed, if D ⊇ C then Inequality (4.12) follows from (4.8) as we have for a core element
(X0D,i)i∈D in subgame (D, v0D) that
X0C(C) = v0(C) ≤ X
0
D(C). (4.13)
If D ⊇ C then one of the components of (X0D,i)i∈C is v0(N), and using Equation (4.7) Inequal-
ity (4.12) follows immediately. Combining Equations (4.11) and (4.12) with Equation (4.10) we
obtain that v¯0 = v0.
By using the matrix of realization vectors X deﬁned by X·i = X0·i + v({i})1S, i ∈ N , we obtain
a risk environment that induces the game (N, v). 
Example 4.16. We illustrate the construction used in the proof of Proposition 4.15 in an example
with 3 players. Table 4.1 presents the value function v of a totally balanced game, as well as the
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C v(C) v0(C)
{1} -10 0
{2} 3 0
{3} -2 0
{1, 2} -4 3
{1, 3} -6 6
{2, 3} 2 1
{1, 2, 3} -1 8
Table 4.1: A totally balanced game and its zero-normalized game.
S X0·1 X
0
·2 X
0
·3 X·1 X·2 X·3
{1} 0 8 8 -10 11 6
{2} 8 0 8 -2 3 6
{3} 8 8 0 -2 11 -2
{1, 2} 1 2 8 -9 5 6
{1, 3} 2 8 4 -8 11 2
{2, 3} 8 1 0 -2 4 -2
{1, 2, 3} 2 1 5 -8 4 3
Table 4.2: Payoff matrices for the zero normalized and the original games.
zero-normalized value function v0 corresponding to v. Note that Inequality (4.7) is satisﬁed by
v0.
In Table 4.2 we have speciﬁed the matrix of realization vectors X0 according to requirements
(4.8) and (4.9). For instance, for C = {1, 2} we have that (X0{1,2},1, X0{1,2},2) = (1, 2) is a point
in the core of the subgame with players 1 and 2, and X0{1,2},3 = 8 = v0(N).
It is easy to check that the risk environment speciﬁed by X0 and the risk measure equal to the
1-expected shortfall with δ = 1 generate v0.
To generate the value function v, we transform X0 into X by specifying X·i = X0·i+v({i})1S for
all i ∈ N . The risk environment corresponding to X and the risk measure equal to the 1-expected
shortfall with δ = 1 can be veriﬁed to induce the game (N, v).
Note that in our constructive proof the statement of Proposition 4.15 is strengthened in the sense
that the family of games induced by risk environments with S ≤ 2n − 1 and the risk measure
equal to the 1-expected shortfall with δ = 1 coincides with the family of totally balanced games
with n players, that is any totally balanced game can be generated by a properly speciﬁed risk
environment with the 1-expected shortfall and 2n − 1 states of nature. From Propositions 4.14
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and 4.15 we derive the following theorem.
Theorem 4.17. The class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced
games, Γr = Γtb.
Kalai and Zemel (1982b) use a similar construction to show that a game is totally balanced if
and only if it is the minimum game of a ﬁnite collection of additive games. A game (N, v)
is called additive if there exists a set of real numbers b1, . . . , bn such that for every C ∈ 2N ,
v(C) =
∑
i∈C bi. For a ﬁnite collection of games {vt}t∈T the minimum game is deﬁned by
(min vt)(C) = mint∈T vt(C). It is easy to see that the totally balanced game v in Table 4.1 is
equal to the minimum game of the collection of additive games generated by XC·, C ∈ 2N \{∅},
in Table 4.2.
4.3.2 Linear Programming Results
Consider a totally balanced game (N, v) ∈ Γtb. Throughout the subsection, we choose S =
2n − 1, p1 = · · · = pS = 1/S, and ρ the risk measure equal to 1-expected shortfall with δ = 1,
just like in Proposition 4.15. Whenever we write v is generated by a matrix of realization vectors
X we mean that the risk allocation game induced by the risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ) equals
(N, v).
In the proof of Proposition 4.15 the matrix of realization vectors X generating v was constructed
using the core requirement3 (4.8): for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
(XC,i)i∈C belongs to the core of (C, vC). (4.14)
The other elements of X were chosen to be sufﬁciently large.
Let a game (N, v) ∈ Γ be given. We develop a linear programming problem such that the
optimal value of the objective function will exceed∑C∈2N v(C) if (N, v) ∈ Γ \ Γtb and is equal
to
∑
C∈2N v(C) whenever the game is totally balanced. Moreover, in the latter case the matrices
derived from the linear program’s optimal solutions generate v.
To do so, given a matrix X we deﬁne the vector Xˆ ∈ RSn by juxtaposing the rows of X ∈ RS×n,
that is Xˆ = (X1·, X2·, . . . , XS·) ∈ RSn, and the reverse operation transforms a vector Xˆ ∈ RSn
into a matrix X ∈ RS×n. We will use the notations Xˆ and X interchangeably.
3There we had a zero normalized game, but it is easy to see that after renormalizing the core requirement is still
satisﬁed.
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Let 0n = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R1×n be the n-dimensional row vector of zeros. For everyC ∈ 2N \{∅},
we deﬁne the matrices
A(C) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
a(C) 0n 0n
0n a(C) 0n
.
.
.
.
.
.
0n 0n · · · a(C)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∈ RS×Sn (4.15)
containing the membership vector a(C) transposed along the “diagonal” and 0n otherwise.
A matrix X ∈ RS×n generates v if and only if for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
v(C) = min
D∈2N\{∅}
XD(C). (4.16)
Equation (4.16) can be rewritten as
v(C) = min
D∈2N
AD·(C)Xˆ, (4.17)
where AD·(C) denotes the D-th row of A(C). It follows from Equation (4.17) that X generates
v if and only if for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
A(C)Xˆ ≥ v(C)1S, (4.18)
where for each C at least one inequality holds with equality.
We introduce some additional notation. Let
E = (a({1}), a({2}), . . . , a(N)) ∈ R1×Sn,
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
v({1})1S
v({2})1S
.
.
.
v(N)1S
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∈ RS
2
, (4.19)
and
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
A({1})
A({2})
.
.
.
A(N)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∈ RS
2×Sn. (4.20)
Consider the linear programming problem (Pv):
minEXˆ
s. t. AXˆ ≥ V
Xˆ ∈ RSn
(Pv).
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The objective function of (Pv) captures the constructive proof of Proposition 4.15, as it is min-
imizing exactly the sum of those elements of Xˆ which are used in the core requirement (4.14).
Using Equation (4.18) it can be seen that the feasibility constraints in the linear program are the
necessary requirements for v to be generated by a feasible solution.
The set of optimal solutions of (Pv) is non-empty, since Xˆ = (k, . . . , k) ∈ RSn is a feasible
solution, where k = maxC∈2N v(C) and the set of feasible solutions is bounded from below. We
denote the set of optimal solutions of (Pv) byX ∗v and a particular optimal solution by Xˆ∗ ∈ RSn.
Proposition 4.18. Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γ and an optimal solution Xˆ∗ ∈ X ∗v of (Pv). The
optimal value of the objective function EXˆ∗ equals∑C∈2N v(C) if and only if v is generated by
X∗.
Proof.
(⇒) By the feasibility constraints it holds that
AD·(C)Xˆ
∗ ≥ v(C), C ∈ 2N \ {∅}, D ∈ 2N \ {∅}, (4.21)
Since by assumption EXˆ∗ =
∑
C∈2N v(C), it follows that
AC·(C)Xˆ
∗ = v(C), C ∈ 2N \ {∅}. (4.22)
It follows by Inequality (4.21) and Equation (4.22) that v is generated by X∗.
(⇐) We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose EXˆ∗ = ∑C∈2N v(C). By the feasibility con-
straints it holds that
EXˆ∗ >
∑
C∈2N
v(C). (4.23)
Note that minD∈2N\{∅} X∗D(C) is attained in row C of X∗, since otherwise we could decrease
the objective function by substituting the row attaining the minimum for row C. Combining this
with Equation (4.23) we obtain that there exists a coalition C ∈ 2N such that
min
D∈2N\{∅}
X∗D(C) > v(C), (4.24)
which implies that v is not generated by X∗, a contradiction. 
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Take any matrix of realization vectors X ∈ Rz×n, where z is a strictly positive integer. Let
Y (X) ∈ R(2
n−1)×n denote a matrix in which for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} we have that YC·(X) = Xk·,
where k ∈ arg mink∈{1,2,...,z}Xk(C). The following proposition claims that the realization matrix
X generates v if and only if Yˆ (X) is an optimal solution of (Pv).
Proposition 4.19. Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γtb. The matrix of realization vectors X ∈ Rz×n
generates v if and only if Yˆ (X) ∈ X ∗v .
Proof.
(⇒) Since X generates v, for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} there exists a state of nature s(C) such that
Xs(C)(C) = v(C),
Xs(C) ≥ v(C), s ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
It follows that Yˆ (X) is a feasible and optimal solution of (Pv).
(⇐) Since the game (N, v) is totally balanced, according to Theorem 4.17 v is generated by some
matrix of realization vectors. By Proposition 4.18, it follows that v is generated by all elements
of X ∗v , so Y (X) generates v, and by construction X generates v. 
The following result shows that any matrix of realization vectors X that generates v satisﬁes
(4.14).
Proposition 4.20. Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γtb. Any optimal solution of (Pv) Xˆ∗ ∈ X ∗v
satisﬁes the core requirement (4.14).
Proof. Take any Xˆ∗ ∈ X ∗v . Since by Proposition 4.15 all totally balanced games can be gen-
erated, we know by Proposition 4.18 that EXˆ∗ =
∑
C∈2N v(C). For every C ∈ 2N \ {∅},
feasibility requires that AC·(C)Xˆ∗ ≥ v(C), so
AC·(C)Xˆ
∗ = v(C). (4.25)
The equalities in (4.25) together with the feasibility constraints imply that the rows of X∗ contain
core allocations of the respective subgames. 
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Propositions 4.19 and 4.20 imply that if a game is generated by X ∈ Rz×n, then Y (X) satisﬁes
the core requirement (4.14). Thus to generate a given totally balanced game the rows of the ma-
trix of realization vectors can be permutated and some of them can be combined, but essentially
the core requirement (4.14) is satisﬁed in all of them.
4.4 Exactness
In this section we show that if there is no aggregate uncertainty in a risk environment, then the
induced risk allocation game is an exact game, and conversely all exact games can be generated
by a properly speciﬁed risk environment with no aggregate uncertainty. Proposition 4.21 claims
that risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty are exact.
Proposition 4.21. All games with (N, v) ∈ Γrnau are exact, Γrnau ⊆ Γe.
Proof. Consider the risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ), where X has no aggregate uncertainty. We
show that the induced risk allocation game is totally balanced and overbalanced (Deﬁnition 4.8),
so exact by Theorem 4.9. Total balancedness follows from Proposition 4.14. For overbalanced-
ness take any vector (λC)C∈2N ∈ R2
N
+ such that
∑
C∈2N\{D,N} λ
Ca(C) = a(N)+λDa(D). Then
by Equation (4.3), the positive homogeneity, and subadditivity of ρ we have that
∑
C∈2N\{D,N}
λCv(C) = −
∑
C∈2N\{D,N}
ρ(
∑
i∈C
λCX·i)
≤ −ρ(
∑
C∈2N \{D,N}
(
∑
i∈C
λCX·i))
= −ρ(
∑
i∈N
(
∑
Ci,C∈2N\{D,N}
λCX·i))
= −ρ(
∑
i∈N
X·i + λ
D
∑
i∈D
X·i), (4.26)
where the last two lines follow from rearranging the summation and using the fact that we have
an overbalanced vector of weights, thus if i ∈ D then
∑
Ci,C∈2N\{D,N} λ
C = 1 + λD, and if
i /∈ D then
∑
Ci,C∈2N\{D,N} λ
C = 1. Using translation invariance and positive homogeneity,
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Inequality (4.26) can be rewritten as
∑
C∈2N\{D,N}
λCv(C) ≤ −ρ(
∑
i∈N
X·i + λ
D
∑
i∈D
X·i)
= −ρ(X(N))− ρ(λDX(D))
= −ρ(X(N))− λDρ(X(D))
= v(N) + λDv(D), (4.27)
thus we have an overbalanced game. 
Proposition 4.22 shows that each exact game is generated by some risk environment with no
aggregate uncertainty.
Proposition 4.22. Each game (N, v) ∈ Γe is induced by some risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ)
such that X has no aggregate uncertainty, Γe ⊆ Γrnau.
Proof. Consider the exact game (N, v) ∈ Γe. We specify the risk environment (N, S, p,X, ρ)
as follows. We introduce a state of nature for all proper non-empty subcoalitions of N , thus
S = 2n − 2. Let p1 = · · · = pS = 1/S, and let ρ be the 1-expected shortfall with δ = 1. For
all C ∈ 2N \ {∅} there exist a core element xC such that xC(C) = v(C) since (N, v) is exact.
Construct X ∈ RS×n as follows. We deﬁne, for all C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N}, XC· = xC . Since xC is a
core element, it holds that XC·(N) = v(N), thus X has no aggregate uncertainty. We denote the
game induced by the risk environment by v¯. Now we have for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅} that
v¯(C) = min
D∈2N\{∅,N}
XD(C) = v(C), (4.28)
thus v¯ = v. 
Note that in the proof of Proposition 4.22 the sum of the entries in each row of X is equal to
v(N). That is why we need only 2n − 2 states of nature.
Combining Propositions 4.21 and 4.22 we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.23. The class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with
the class of exact games, Γrnau = Γe.
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Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) show that a game is convex if and only if
any of its subgame is exact. We have provided an alternative proof in Theorem 3.18. This result
implies directly that if there are less than four players, then the class of exact games coincides
with the class of convex games. Using this observation Theorem 4.23 can be reformulated as
follows.
Theorem 4.24. Let n ∈ N be such that n < 4. Then the class of risk allocation games with n
portfolios and no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of convex games with n players,
Γrnau = Γc.
Theorem 4.24 is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.25. In this example we show how a 3-player convex game is generated by a risk
allocation game with no aggregate uncertainty. Note that the game in Table 4.1 of Example 4.16
is not convex since v({1, 2})+v({1, 3}) = −4−6 = −10 > v({1})+v({1, 2, 3}) = −10−1 =
−11. However, by changing v({1, 2}) to -5 we get the convex game displayed in Table 4.3.
C v(C)
{1} -10
{2} 3
{3} -2
{1, 2} -5
{1, 3} -6
{2, 3} 2
{1, 2, 3} -1
Table 4.3: The value function of a convex game v.
S X·1 X·2 X·3
∑
i∈N Xs,i
1 -3 4 -2 -1
2 -7 3 3 -1
3 -10 5 4 -1
Table 4.4: A matrix of realization vectors generating v.
This game is generated by the risk environment with matrix of realization vectors X depicted in
Table 4.4 and the risk measure of 1-expected shortfall with δ = 1.
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Notice that the rows of X correspond to appropriately chosen marginal contribution vectors. For
instance, in the ﬁrst row of X we have the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the
permutation (3,2,1): v({3}) − v({∅}) = −2 − 0 = −2, v({2, 3}) − v({2}) = 2 − (−2) = 4,
and v({1, 2, 3})− v({2, 3}) = −1 − 2 = −3. At any marginal contribution vector, there are n
coalitions that exactly receive their value. Thus to generate a convex game fewer states of nature
are required than 2n − 1. In the example 3 states of nature sufﬁce. Also note that all rows of
X sum up to -1, since the sum of the marginal contributions is always the value of the grand
coalition, and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Similarly to Proposition 4.19 we can characterize all the risk environments that generate a given
exact game.
Proposition 4.26. Consider a game (N, v) ∈ Γe. The matrix of realization vectors X ∈ Rz×n
without aggregate uncertainty generates v if and only if Yˆ (X) ∈ X ∗v .
Proof. Proposition 4.19 characterizes all the matrices that generate a given totally balanced
game. Since by Proposition 4.21 only exact games can be generated with matrices satisfying no
aggregate uncertainty, the proof is straightforward. 
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed transferable utility cooperative games derived from a risk
environment: risk allocation games. We have shown that the class of risk allocation games
coincides with the class of totally balanced games. This result makes sure that a regulator or
performance evaluator can always allocate risk in a stable way: there will always be a core
element, no matter how the risk environment is changing.
We have also studied the case when the aggregate portfolio has the same payoff in all states of
nature. We proved that if there is no aggregate uncertainty then the class of risk allocation games
equals the class of exact games, where for each coalition there is a core element such that the
coalition gets only its stand-alone value. This means that if there is no aggregate uncertainty,
then not necessarily everybody beneﬁts from the diversiﬁcation effects in a stable allocation of
risk. The regulator or performance evaluator has much discretionary power in allocating risk,
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since for each coalition there is always a stable allocation of risk such that the coalition gets its
stand-alone value.
We have characterized all the matrices of realization vectors that generate a given totally balanced
game or a given exact game. In both cases the vectors derived from the matrices by juxtaposing
their rows are related to the optimal solutions of a linear programming problem.
Denault (2001) shows that if a risk allocation game for an arbitrary matrix of realization vectors
is convex then the risk measure by which it is induced is necessarily additive, thus the generated
risk allocation game is also additive. However, by imposing some structure on the matrix of
realization vectors we have proven the following theorem: If there are less than four players and
the matrix of realization vectors has no aggregate uncertainty, then the generated risk allocation
game is convex, and any convex game can be generated by such a risk environment.
Chapter 5
Convex and Exact Games with
Non-transferable Utility
In this chapter we generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact
NTU game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning
that this coalition does not necessarily beneﬁt from the gains of forming the grand coalition in
an allocation which is robust against all coalitional deviations. We show that each of ordinal,
coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uniﬁed under NTU exactness.
Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact,
ordinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games
to one another.
5.1 Introduction
Convex cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) introduced by Shapley (1971) arise
from a wide range of applications. Airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy
games (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), sequencing games (Curiel, Pederzoli, and Tijs, 1989) and
standard tree games (Granot, Maschler, Owen, and Zhu, 1996) are all convex.
Convex TU games are exact (Schmeidler, 1972). In an exact game for each coalition there
is a core allocation such that the coalition only gets its stand-alone value. In Chapter 4 we
have shown that the class of exact TU games equals the class of risk allocation games with no
aggregate uncertainty. A risk allocation game is a TU game derived from a coherent measure
of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) and the realization vectors of some individual
portfolios. Usually the risk of the aggregate portfolio is low compared to the risk involved in the
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individual portfolios. As an extreme case, no aggregate uncertainty refers to the case when the
value of the aggregate portfolio is constant over all states of nature.
Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended convexity to games with non-transferable utility
(NTU) to deﬁne ordinal and cardinal convexity, respectively. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer
(2002) analyze coalition merge convexity, individual merge convexity, and marginal convexity in
an NTU setting.
Ordinally convex NTU games have numerous applications. Peleg (1984) transforms a social
choice situation with a convex effectivity function into an NTU game which is ordinally convex.
Demange (1987) provides two examples: a model of public good, and a production economy
with increasing returns to scale; Masuzawa (2003) adds N-person prisoners’ dilemma games
and oligopoly models to this class.
Convex NTU games are important classes of games, but unfortunately the aforementioned ﬁve
classes of NTU convex games do not coincide in general. The only general result (Theorem
5.14) is that coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity, and individual merge
convexity implies marginal convexity. It is natural to seek a result that is analogous to convex
TU games being exact.
In this chapter we generalize exactness to the NTU setting. In an exact NTU game for each
coalition there is a core element on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does
not necessarily beneﬁt from the gains of forming the grand coalition in an allocation which is
robust against all coalitional deviations. We show that each of ordinal, coalitionmerge, individual
merge and marginal convexity implies NTU exactness.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We start with the notation and the necessary deﬁnitions
for TU and NTU games. In Section 5.3 we deﬁne NTU exactness and show that an NTU game
satisfying any of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity is NTU
exact. In Section 5.4 we conclude by relating the various classes of NTU games to one another.
5.2 Notation, Deﬁnitions, Existing Results
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the ﬁnite set of players, 2N = {C | C ⊆ N} is the power set of N ,
N = 2N \ {∅} is the collection of coalitions, the non-empty subsets of N. Let R denote the set
of all real numbers. RN is the n-dimensional Euclidean space generated by the set of players.
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An element of RN is denoted by a vector x = (xi)i∈N . For a coalition C ∈ N , let xC = (xi)i∈C
denote the restriction of x on C. For x, y ∈ RN , y ≥ x denotes yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ N , and y  x
denotes yi > xi for all i ∈ N .
Let ΔN denote the unit simplex in RN , ΔN = {x ∈ RN | xi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈N xi = 1}. For every C ∈
N deﬁne the set ΔC = {x ∈ ΔN |
∑
i∈C xi = 1}, and let Δ be a Cartesian product of ΔC over
all C ∈ N . Let ΔN denote the unit simplex inRN , ΔN = {λ ∈ RN | λC ≥ 0,
∑
C∈N λ
C = 1}.
For a set A ⊆ RN , the symbols cl A, ∂A and int A denote, respectively, the closure, the boundary
and the interior of A. For x ∈ RN , x ∈ cl A if there exists a sequence (xk)k∈N with xk ∈ A for
all k ∈ N and (xk)k∈N → x; x ∈ ∂A if x ∈ cl A ∩ cl (RN \ A); and x ∈ int A if x ∈ A \ ∂A.
5.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
A value function v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0 gives rise to a cooperative game with transfer-
able utility (TU game, for short) (N, v). Let ΓTU denote the set of TU games with n players. An
allocation is a vector x ∈ RN , where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N . For a coalition C ∈ N ,
let x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi. An allocation x ∈ RN is called efﬁcient if x(N) = v(N), individually
rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N, and coalitionally rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ N .
The core is the set of efﬁcient and coalitionally rational allocations.
Schmeidler (1972) introduces exact TU games.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A TU game (N, v) is exact if for each C ∈ 2N there exists a core allocation x
such that x(C) = v(C).
Let ΓTUe denote the class of exact TU games with n players. Convex TU games (Shapley, 1971)
can be deﬁned and characterized as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.2. A TU game (N, v) is convex if it satisﬁes the following three equivalent condi-
tions:
∀S, T ∈ 2N : v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), (5.1)
∀U ∈ 2N ; ∀S  T ⊆ N \ U : v(S ∪ U)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ U)− v(T ), (5.2)
∀i ∈ N ; ∀S  T ⊆ N \ {i}: v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ). (5.3)
Let ΓTUc denote the class of convex TU games with n players.
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A permutation of the players in N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N , where σ(i) denotes which
player in N is at position i, and σ−1(i) denotes the position of player i. Let Gn denote the set of
all permutations on N . For a permutation σ ∈ Gn, P σi = {j ∈ N | σ−1(j) < σ−1(i)} denotes
the coalition of players which precede i with respect to the order σ. In a permutation σ ∈ Gn,
mσi (v) = v(P
σ
i ∪ {i}) − v(P
σ
i ) denotes the marginal contribution of player i to the preceding
players, and mσ(v) = (mσ1 , mσ2 , . . . , mσn) is the vector of marginal contributions. Shapley (1971)
and Ichiishi (1981) characterize convex TU games as follows.
Theorem 5.3. The TU game (N, v) is convex if and only if mσ(v) belongs to the core of (N, v)
for all σ ∈ Gn.
Theorem 5.3 implies directly the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. If a TU game (N, v) is convex, then it is exact, ΓTUc ⊆ ΓTUe .
For a TU game (N, v) and a coalition C ∈ N the subgame (C, vC) is obtained by restricting
v to subsets of C. Following Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters, and Voorneveld (1999), we deﬁne
totally exact TU games.
Deﬁnition 5.5. A TU game (N, v) is totally exact if for every C ∈ N its subgame (C, vC) is
exact.
Let ΓTUte denote the class of totally exact TU games with n players. Biswas, Parthasarathy,
Potters, and Voorneveld (1999) show the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. A TU game is totally exact if and only if it is convex, ΓTUte = ΓTUc .
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5.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU game, for short) (N, V ) is a family of
sets V = 〈V (S)〉S∈2N satisfying the following assumptions:
V (∅) = ∅, (5.4)
V (S) = Vp(S)×R
N\S, where Vp(S) ⊆ RS, for all S ∈ N , (5.5)
0 ∈ V (S) for all S ∈ N , (5.6)
V (N) is closed, (5.7)
comprehensiveness: if x ∈ V (S), y ∈ RN , yS ≤ xS, then y ∈ V (S), (5.8)
the sets V +p (S) = {xS ∈ RS+ | x ∈ V (S)} are bounded for all S ∈ N . (5.9)
Let ΓNTU denote the set of NTU games with n players.
The core of an NTU game (N, V ), C(V ) consists of those elements x ∈ V (N) for which it holds
that there exist no S ∈ N and no y ∈ V (S) such that xS  yS, which by comprehensiveness is
equivalent to x /∈ int V (S) for any S ∈ N . Therefore,
C(V ) = V (N) \
⋃
S∈N
int V (S). (5.10)
Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) provide the following balancedness condition for NTU games.
Deﬁnition 5.7. Consider a convex-valued correspondence Π : RN → Δ with a closed graph.
The NTU game (N, V ) is Π-balanced provided that the following condition is satisﬁed: If x ∈
R
N , π ∈ Π(x), and λ ∈ ΔN are such that
x ∈
⋂
S∈N ,λS>0
V (S),
πN =
∑
S∈N
λSπS,
then x ∈ V (N).
Π-balancedness is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the core in a non-transferable utility
game to be non-empty. Let ΓNTUΠ−b denote the class of Π-balanced NTU games with n players.
For an NTU game (N, V ) and a coalition S ∈ N a subgame (S, V S) is obtained by restricting V
to subsets of S. Let ΓNTUt−Π−b denote the class of totally Π-balanced NTU games with n players,
having a non-empty core in each of their subgames.
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NTU convex games have been deﬁned in ﬁve ways.
Deﬁnition 5.8. (Vilkov, 1977) An NTU game (N, V ) is ordinally convex if for all S, T ∈ N we
have V (S) ∩ V (T ) ⊆ V (S ∩ T ) ∪ V (S ∪ T ).
Let ΓNTUoc denote the class of ordinally convex NTU games with n players. For S ∈ 2N let
V ◦(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | xi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S}. Note that V ◦(S) = Vp(S) ×
{
0N\S
}
, for all
S ∈ N .
Deﬁnition 5.9. (Sharkey, 1981) An NTU game (N, V ) is cardinally convex if for all S, T ∈ N
we have V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) ⊆ V ◦(S ∩ T ) + V ◦(S ∪ T ).
Let ΓNTUcc denote the class of cardinally convex NTU games with n players.
To discuss the three marginalistic interpretations of NTU convexity (coalition merge, individual
merge and marginal convexity) introduced by Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002), we need
the following deﬁnitions. Note that the deﬁnitions are modiﬁed compared to Hendrickx, Borm,
and Timmer (2002), since we use Assumptions (5.4)-(5.9) whereas they assume that V (S) ⊆ RS
and V (S) is closed for all S ∈ N ; they do not deﬁne V (∅); and they assume zero normalization
and monotonicity.
An NTU game (N, V ) is zero normalized if V ({i}) = {x ∈ RN : xi ≤ 0} for all i ∈ N ; it is
monotonic if for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and for all x ∈ V (S) there exists a y ∈ V (T ) such that yS ≥ xS .
The set of weakly Pareto efﬁcient allocations for coalition S ∈ N is deﬁned by WP(S) = {x ∈
V (S) | y ∈ V (S) : yS  xS}. Let αi = sup{xi | x ∈ V ({i})}, i ∈ N . The set of individually
rational allocations for coalition S ∈ N is deﬁned by IR(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | ∀i ∈ S : xi ≥ αi}.
An NTU game (N, V ) is superadditive if for all coalitions S, T ∈ N such that S ∩ T = ∅ we
have V (S) ∩ V (T ) ⊆ V (S ∪ T ); it is individually superadditive if for all i ∈ N and for all
S ⊆ N \ {i} we have V (S) ∩ V ({i}) ⊆ V (S ∪ {i}).
Deﬁnition 5.10. Consider an NTU game (N, V ) and a permutation σ ∈ Gn. The vector of
marginal contributions Mσ(V ) is deﬁned by
Mσσ(j)(V ) = sup{yσ(j)|y ∈ V (σ(1), . . . , σ(j)),
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : yσ(i) ≥M
σ
σ(i)(V )}
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Note that in Deﬁnition 5.10 we use supremum, since we do not assume V (S) to be closed for all
S ∈ N , and we also do not assume monotonicity (we deﬁne sup(∅) = −∞).
Equation (5.2) in Deﬁnition 5.2 says that for any coalitionU , the marginal contribution to a larger
coalition is larger. The same idea in the NTU setting is formulated as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.11. An NTU game (N, V ) is coalition merge convex if for all S, T ∈ 2N , U ∈ N
such that S  T ⊆ N \ U the following statement is true: For all x ∈ WP(S) ∩ IR(S), all
y ∈ V (T ), and all z ∈ V (S ∪ U) such that zS ≥ xS , there exists a v ∈ V (T ∪ U) such that
vT ≥ yT and vU ≥ zU .1
Let ΓNTUcmc denote the class of coalition merge convex NTU games with n players. Equation (5.3)
in Deﬁnition 5.2 says that for any player i, the marginal contribution to a larger coalition is larger.
The analogous concept in the NTU setting reads as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.12. An NTU game (N, V ) is individual merge convex if for all S, T ∈ 2N , j ∈ N
such that S  T ⊆ N \ {j} the following statement is true: For all x ∈ WP(S) ∩ IR(S), all
y ∈ V (T ), and all z ∈ V (S ∪ {j}) such that zS ≥ xS , there exists a v ∈ V (T ∪ {j}) such that
vT ≥ yT and vj ≥ zj .2
Let ΓNTUimc denote the class of individual merge convex NTU games with n players. Theorem 5.3
is also generalized to the NTU setting.
Deﬁnition 5.13. An NTU game (N, V ) is marginal convex if for all σ ∈ Gn we have Mσ(V ) ∈
C(V ).
Let ΓNTUmc denote the class of marginal convex NTU games with n players. The ﬁve notions of
NTU convexity are not equivalent in general. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) show that
ordinal and cardinal convexity are not related to the other four types of convexity. They also
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.14. If an NTU game (N, V ) is coalition merge convex, then it is individual merge
convex, ΓNTUcmc ⊆ Γ
NTU
imc . If an NTU game (N, V ) is individual merge convex, then it is marginal
convex, ΓNTUimc ⊆ Γ
NTU
mc .
1Note that superadditivity was required in the original deﬁnition of Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002). In
our setting it is implied by coalition merge convexity using Assumption (5.4), S = ∅ and comprehensiveness.
2Note that individual superadditivity was required in the original deﬁnition of Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer
(2002). In our setting it is implied by individual merge convexity using Assumption (5.4), S = ∅ and comprehen-
siveness.
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Proof. In their proof Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) assume zero normalization, mono-
tonicity and V (S) is closed for all S ∈ N . If a game is not zero normalized, then one can zero
normalize it and after the proof normalize back. One can show that monotonicity is implied by
individual merge convexity. If V (S) is open one can verify that all the steps of the proof of
Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) remain valid using Deﬁnition 5.10. 
To illustrate the subtle differences between the various notions of NTU convexity, consider the
following example of an ordinally convex NTU game which is neither cardinal, nor marginal,
thus by Theorem 5.14 nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convex.
Example 5.15. (Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer, 2002, Example 4.1.) Consider the following
NTU game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}. Let
V ({i}) = {x ∈ R3 | xi ≤ 0} for all i ∈ N,
V ({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R3 | x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≤ 2},
V ({1, 3}) = {x ∈ R3 | x1 + x3 ≤ 1},
V ({2, 3}) = {x ∈ R3 | x2 ≤ 0, x3 ≤ 0},
V (N) = {x ∈ R3 |
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ 2}.
To show that (N, V ) is ordinally convex, let S, T ∈ N and let x ∈ V (S) ∩ V (T ). If S ⊆ T ,
T ⊆ S or S ∩T = ∅, then ordinal convexity is easy to check. If S = {1, 2} and T = {1, 3}, then
x1 ≤ 0 and thus x ∈ V (S ∩ T ). Otherwise,
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 2, thus x ∈ V (S ∪ T ).
Cardinal convexity of (N, V ) fails, since (0, 2, 0) ∈ V ◦({1, 2}) and (0, 0, 1) ∈ V ◦({1, 3}), but
(0, 2, 0) + (0, 0, 1) = (0, 2, 1) /∈ V ◦({1}) + V ◦(N).
Marginal convexity of (N, V ) is also not satisﬁed, since the vector of marginal contributions
corresponding to σ = (1, 2, 3), Mσ(V ) = (0, 2, 0) does not belong to the core: coalition {1, 3}
blocks it. Therefore, by Theorem 5.14, (N, V ) is neither individual merge, nor coalition merge
convex.
We will come back to Example 5.15 in Examples 5.18 and 5.20.
To the best of our knowledge cardinally convex games have no applications, and relatively little
is known about them: Sharkey (1981) proves that they have a non-empty core in each of their
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subgames; Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) show that for 3-player NTU games they imply
all the other NTU convexity notions. We will concentrate in the remaining of the chapter on the
other NTU convexity notions.
5.3 Exact NTU Games
Theorem 5.4 claims that convex TU games are exact. In this section we generalize exactness
to the NTU setting and verify whether each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge or
marginal convexity implies NTU exactness.
Deﬁnition 5.16. An NTU game (N, V ) is NTU exact if for each S ∈ N there exists a core
allocation x ∈ C(V ) such that x ∈ ∂V (S).
Let ΓNTUe denote the class of exact NTU games with n players. Every TU game (N, v) with
v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ N gives rise to an NTU game (N, V ) by deﬁning V (S) = {x ∈
R
N | x(S) ≤ v(S)} for all S ∈ N . Note that Assumptions (5.4)-(5.9) are satisﬁed by (N, V ). It
is a straightforward exercise to verify the following theorem.
Theorem 5.17. A TU game (N, v) is exact if and only if the corresponding NTU game (N, V ) is
NTU exact.
Note that if an NTU game (N, V ) is NTU exact, then each of its subgame has a core element,
since by deﬁnition for each S ∈ N there exists a core allocation x ∈ C(V ) such that x ∈ ∂V (S),
and x cannot be blocked in the subgame (S, V S) either. Thus exact NTU games are a subset of
totally Π-balanced games, ΓNTUe ⊆ ΓNTUt−Π−b.
Next, we check whether the NTU game in Example 5.15 is NTU exact.
Example 5.18. (Example 5.15 continued.)
The NTU game (N, V ) in Example 5.15 is NTU exact, since (0, 0, 2) is a core element on the
boundary of V ({1}), V ({2}), V ({1, 2}); (2, 0, 0) is a core element on the boundary of V ({2}),
V ({3}), V ({2, 3}); and (1, 1, 0) is a core element on the boundary of V ({1, 3}).
If for all S ∈ N all core elements of the subgame (S, V S) could be extended to the core of the
original game by increasing the elements outside S, then NTU exactness would follow imme-
diately, since core elements of (S, V S) are on the boundary of V (S). Example 5.15 shows that
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exactness of an ordinally convex NTU game is not so trivial. The core of the subgame related
to coalition {1, 2} is {x ∈ R2 | x1 = 0, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 2}. Note that only some elements in this
core can be extended to the core of the original game: {x ∈ R2 | x1 = 0, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1}, since if
y1 = 0, 1 < y2 ≤ 2, y3 = 2− y2, then coalition {1, 3} blocks allocation y in the original game.
To analyze the NTU exactness of ordinally convex NTU games we need to deﬁne the notion of
a reduced game. Peleg (1986) uses it when an arbitrary coalition leaves the game, but here we
only need to consider one player leaving the grand coalition.
Deﬁnition 5.19. Take any NTU game (N, V ), n ≥ 2. Deﬁne:
M ={1, . . . , n− 1} = N \ {n}, m = n− 1,
αn = sup{xn | x ∈ V ({n})},
W (S) ={x ∈ RM | ∃β > αn such that (x, β) ∈ V (S ∪ {n})}, S ⊆M.
P (S) ={x ∈ RM | (x, δ) ∈ V (S), ∀δ ∈ R}, S ⊆M.
Then, the reduced game (M,U) is given by:
U(S) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{x ∈ RM | (x, αn) ∈ V (N)} for S = M ,
∅ for S = ∅,
W (S) ∪ P (S) otherwise.
Example 5.20. (Example 5.15 continued.)
If player 3 leaves the grand coalition in Example 5.15, then the derived reduced game looks as
follows. U({1, 2}) = {x ∈ R2 | x1 + x2 ≤ 2}, U(∅) = ∅. Moreover, W ({1}) = {x ∈ R2 | x1 <
1}, W ({2}) = ∅, P ({1}) = {x ∈ R2 | x1 ≤ 0} and P ({2}) = {x ∈ R2 | x2 ≤ 0} imply that
U({1}) = {x ∈ R2 | x1 < 1} and U({2}) = {x ∈ R2 | x2 ≤ 0}.
Note that the reduced game is not zero normalized and U({1}) is open. Moreover, all the core
elements of the reduced game {x ∈ R2 | x1+x2 = 2, 1 ≤ x1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1} can be extended
to the core of the original game by setting x3 = αn = 0.
Greenberg (1985) shows the following lemma about reduced games.3
Lemma 5.21. (Greenberg, 1985) Consider an ordinally convex NTU game (N, V ). Then the
reduced game (M,U) is ordinally convex as well.
3Greenberg (1985) considers the setting when V (S) ⊆ RN+ instead of V (S) ⊆ RN , for all S ∈ N , but due to
Assumptions (5.6) and (5.8) all the arguments can be carried over to this setting.
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We show the following theorem.
Theorem 5.22. If an NTU game (N, V ) is ordinally convex, then it is exact, ΓNTUoc ⊆ ΓNTUe .
Proof.
We proceed by induction. For n = 1, if an NTU game (N, V ) is ordinally convex, then it is
exact, since max{x | x ∈ V (N)} is well deﬁned, is on the boundary of V (N) and belongs to the
core. Assume that the theorem holds for any game with less than n players. We will show that
it also holds for n players. Let (N, V ) be an ordinally convex NTU game with n players, n ≥ 2.
Consider the reduced NTU game (M,U) (Deﬁnition 5.19).
Since (M,U) is an ordinally convex NTU game with n− 1 players (Lemma 5.21), we can apply
the induction hypothesis. That is, for each S ∈ 2M \ {∅} there exists an x ∈ C(U) such that
x ∈ ∂U(S).
The proof consists of three steps. In Step I we show that (x, αn) ∈ C(V ) for all x ∈ C(U);
in Step II we establish that for each S ∈ 2M there exists an x, such that (x, αn) ∈ C(V ) and
(x, αn) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {n}); and in Step III we conclude that (N, V ) is NTU exact.
Step I. Let x ∈ C(U). By deﬁnition x ∈ U(M), that is (x, αn) ∈ V (N). First, we show that
(x, αn) in (N, V ) cannot be blocked by any coalition T  N . Suppose to the contrary that there
exist β > αn, z  x and T  N such that (z, β) ∈ V (T ). We consider two cases: T = M or
T = M .
Case 1: T = M . Then (z, β) ∈ V (M) and by comprehensiveness for all  > 0 we have that
(z, αn − ) ∈ V (M). Also, for all  > 0 we have that (z, αn − ) ∈ V ({n}) by the deﬁnition
of αn. Ordinal convexity implies that V (M) ∩ V ({n}) ⊆ V (N), thus for all  > 0 we have
that (z, αn − ) ∈ V (N). Since V (N) is closed, (z, αn) ∈ V (N), implying that z ∈ U(M),
contradicting x ∈ C(U).
Case 2: T = M . If n /∈ T , then z ∈ P (T ) and hence T would block x in (M,U), contradicting
x ∈ C(U). If n ∈ T , then T \ {n} = ∅, since β > αn implies (z, β) /∈ V ({n}). Therefore,
z ∈ W (T \ {n}), again contradicting x ∈ C(U).
Next we show that (x, αn) in (N, V ) cannot be blocked by N either. Otherwise there exist β >
αn, z  x such that (z, β) ∈ V (N). It follows using comprehensiveness that (z, αn) ∈ V (N),
implying that (z, αn) ∈ U(M), again contradicting x ∈ C(U). Thus (x, αn) ∈ C(V ).
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Note that the construction used shows that all core elements of the reduced game can be extended
to the original game.
Step II. If S = ∅ or S = M , then take any x ∈ C(U) such that x ∈ ∂U(T ) for some T ∈
2M \ {∅}. Note that such x exists by applying the induction hypothesis. By Step I we have that
(x, αn) ∈ C(V ). If S = ∅, then (x, αn) ∈ ∂V ({n}) by the deﬁnition of αn. If S = M , then
(x, αn) ∈ C(V ) implies that (x, αn) ∈ ∂V (N) = ∂V (M ∪ {n}).
If S = ∅ and S = M , then take any x ∈ C(U) such that x ∈ ∂U(S). Note that such x
exists by applying the induction hypothesis again. Since S = ∅ and S = M , we have that
U(S) = W (S) ∪ P (S). So
x ∈ ∂(W (S) ∪ P (S)) = cl (W (S) ∪ P (S)) ∩ cl (RM \ (W (S) ∪ P (S)))
= (cl W (S) ∪ cl P (S)) ∩ cl (RM \ (W (S) ∪ P (S)))
= (∂W (S) \ int P (S)) ∪ (∂P (S) \ int W (S)),
which implies that there are two (not exclusive) cases: x ∈ ∂W (S) \ int P (S) or
x ∈ ∂P (S) \ int W (S).
Case 1: x ∈ ∂W (S)\int P (S). Then, x ∈ ∂W (S) implies x ∈ cl W (S)∩cl (RM\W (S)). Since
x ∈ cl W (S), there exists a sequence (xk)k∈N with xk ∈ W (S) for all k ∈ N and (xk)k∈N → x.
Then, by the deﬁnition of W (S), there exists a sequence (βk)k∈N with βk > αn and (xk, βk) ∈
V (S ∪ {n}) for all k ∈ N. Due to comprehensiveness (xk, αn) ∈ V (S ∪ {n}) for all k ∈ N as
well, and the sequence (xk, αn)k∈N converges to (x, αn), implying that (x, αn) ∈ cl V (S ∪{n}).
Since x ∈ cl (RM \W (S)) as well, there exists a sequence (xk)k∈N with xk ∈ RM \W (S) for
all k ∈ N and (xk)k∈N → x, that is for all β > αn we have that (xk, β) ∈ RN \ V (S ∪ {n})
for all k ∈ N. In particular, (xk, αn + 1/(k + 1)) ∈ RN \ V (S ∪ {n}) for all k ∈ N, and
(xk, αn +1/(k+1))k∈N → (x, αn), implying that (x, αn) ∈ cl (RN \V (S ∪{n})). So (x, αn) ∈
cl V (S ∪ {n}) ∩ cl (RN \ V (S ∪ {n})), thus (x, αn) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {n}).
Case 2: x ∈ ∂P (S) \ int W (S). By ordinal convexity of (N, V ) we have V (S) ∩ V ({n}) ⊆
V (S∪{n}), which together with x ∈ ∂P (S) implies that there exists a sequence (xk, αkn)k∈N with
(xk, αkn) ∈ V (S ∪ {n}) for all k ∈ N and (xk, αkn)k∈N → (x, αn), so (x, αn) ∈ cl V (S ∪ {n}).
Since x /∈ int W (S), for all y  x and for all β > αn we have (y, β) /∈ V (S ∪ {n}). Thus
there exists a sequence (xk, αn + 1/(k + 1))k∈N → (x, αn) such that (xk, αn + 1/(k + 1)) ∈
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N \V (S ∪{n}), implying that (x, αn) ∈ cl (RN \V (S ∪{n})). So (x, αn) ∈ cl V (S ∪{n})∩
cl (RN \ V (S ∪ {n})), thus (x, αn) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {n}).
Step III. In Step II we have established that for each S ∈ 2M there exists an x, such that
(x, αn) ∈ C(V ) and (x, αn) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {n}). Instead of using player n, we could do the
same construction with player i, implying that for each S ∈ 2M there exists an x, such that
(x, αi) ∈ C(V ) and (x, αi) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {i}). To show that for each T ∈ N there exists a
y ∈ C(V ) such that y ∈ ∂V (T ), choose i to be any member of T and let S = T \ {i}. Then,
there exists an x, such that (x, αi) ∈ C(V ) and (x, αi) ∈ ∂V (S ∪ {i}), so by setting y = (x, αi)
we have that y ∈ C(V ) and y ∈ ∂V (T ). 
By Theorem 5.14, to verify whether the marginalistic interpretations of NTU convexity imply
NTU exactness, it is enough to analyze marginal convexity.
Theorem 5.23. If an NTU game (N, V ) is marginal convex, then it is exact, ΓNTUmc ⊆ ΓNTUe .
Proof. Consider a marginal convex NTU game (N, V ), and a coalition S ∈ N . For exactness
we have to show that there is a core element on the boundary of V (S). Let σ¯ be a permutation
such that S ∈ {σ¯(1), {σ¯(1), σ¯(2)}, {σ¯(1), σ¯(2), σ¯(3)}, . . . , N}. Since (N, V ) is marginal con-
vex, we have that M σ¯(V ) ∈ C(V ). By deﬁnition, M σ¯(V ) is on the boundary of V (T ) for all
T ∈ {σ¯(1), {σ¯(1), σ¯(2)}, {σ¯(1), σ¯(2), σ¯(3)}, . . . , N}, thus it is a core element on the boundary
of V (S) as well. 
Using Theorems 5.14 and 5.23 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.24. Each of coalition merge convexity, individual merge convexity and marginal
convexity implies exactness in the NTU setting, ΓNTUcmc ⊆ ΓNTUimc ⊆ ΓNTUmc ⊆ ΓNTUe .
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have generalized exactness to games with non-transferable utility to get the
class of NTU exact games (ΓNTUe ). In an exact NTU game for each coalition there is a core
allocation on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does not necessarily
beneﬁt from the gains of forming the grand coalition in an allocation which is robust against all
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coalitional deviations. We have noted that NTU exact games are a subset of totally Π-balanced
NTU games (ΓNTUt−Π−b), having a non-empty core in each of their subgames.
We have shown that the classes of ordinally convex (ΓNTUoc ), coalition merge convex (ΓNTUcmc ),
individual merge convex (ΓNTUimc ) and marginal convex (ΓNTUmc ) NTU games are a subset of NTU
exact games.
Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) show that the aforementioned ﬁve classes of NTU convex
games do not coincide in general. The only general result (Theorem 5.14) is that coalition merge
convexity implies individual merge convexity (ΓNTUcmc ⊆ ΓNTUimc ), and individual merge convexity
implies marginal convexity (ΓNTUimc ⊆ ΓNTUmc ).
Theorem 5.6 claims that the class of convex TU games coincides with the class of totally exact
TU games. In the NTU setting we do not have such a theorem. Let ΓNTUte denote the class
of totally exact NTU games with n players. Since an ordinally convex game is exact, and all
subgames of an ordinally convex game are ordinally convex, we have that ΓNTUoc ⊆ ΓNTUte . For
marginal convex games a similar argument leads to ΓNTUmc ⊆ ΓNTUte .
However, using our results it is easy to provide counterexamples where NTU total exactness
implies none of the NTU convexity notions. For instance, the NTU game in Example 5.15 is
ordinally convex, and as we argued that game is totally NTU exact. But it is neither cardinal, nor
marginal, nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convex. So neither cardinal, nor marginal,
nor individual merge, nor coalitionmerge convexity is implied by total NTU exactness in general.
Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2000) provide an example (Example 4.6 there) for an NTU game
which is marginal convex but not ordinally convex. That example can be used to show that total
NTU exactness does not imply ordinal convexity either.
Analogously to TU games in Figure 3.1, we summarize the relationships between the various
classes of NTU games in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Subsets of Π-balanced games.
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Summary
To have an adequate determination of capital requirements in the banking industry and a proper
performance evaluation of portfolio managers it is crucial to measure and allocate risk in an
appropriate way.
A measure of risk assigns a real number to the probability distribution of the future value of a
portfolio. It can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent has to add to
his portfolio, and to invest in a zero coupon bond for its risk to be acceptable to the regulator. The
literature knows of numerous possible ways to measure risk; lately interest shifted to coherent
measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) satisfying the following four axioms:
monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance. Adding two more
axioms, comonotonic additivity and law invariance, one obtains a subclass of coherent measures
of risk, called spectral measures of risk.
Most importantly, subadditivity requires that the risk of an aggregate portfolio should not exceed
the total risk of the individual portfolios: it captures the notion of diversiﬁcation. The diversiﬁ-
cation beneﬁts should be allocated somehow, preferably in a stable way, when no collection of
individual portfolios would be better off if they separate from the others.
In this thesis we analyze the aforementioned axioms using tools from general equilibrium theory
and study the allocation of risk by means of cooperative game theory.
Chapter 2 of the thesis elaborates on analyzing the axioms of coherent and spectral measures of
risk using an exchange economy model. By doing so we contribute to the research agenda that
connects ﬁnance to general equilibrium theory. The corresponding measure of risk, the so-called
GE measure of risk of a portfolio is the negative of its equilibrium market price in the exchange
economy.
We prove that the GE measure of risk is a coherent measure of risk, thus coherent measures of
risk are compatible with a natural general equilibrium approach to measure risk. However, using
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the insight of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) that the risk of a
portfolio does not only depend on the probability distribution of its payoff (law invariance), but
also on how these payoffs are correlated to those of the market portfolio, we show that the GE
measure of risk does not satisfy law invariance, and is therefore not a spectral measure of risk.
We model the problem of risk allocation by cooperative game theory. A transferable utility (TU)
game consists of a ﬁnite set of players and a value function specifying the maximum attainable
utility (money) for all the coalitions of players. The core of a TU game consists of those efﬁ-
cient allocations which are robust against all coalitional deviations. One obtains a subgame by
restricting the game to a subset of players. Games having a non-empty core in every subgame
are called totally balanced.
In Chapter 3 we provide a set of linear programming problems to study a subclass of totally
balanced games having a nice core structure, exact games (Schmeidler, 1972). A game is exact
if for each coalition there is a core allocation such that the coalition only gets its stand-alone
value. By the linear programming problems one can easily check whether a game is exact or
not. Using the dual of the linear programming problems we develop two new characterizations
of exact games, complementing earlier characterizations by Schmeidler (1972) and Azrieli and
Lehrer (2005). The characterizations can be used to verify exactness of a game, we apply them
in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 4 we come back to the question of the distribution of the risk diversiﬁcation beneﬁts.
Risk allocation games (Denault, 2001) are transferable utility cooperative games deﬁned to this
purpose. A risk allocation game arises from a risk environment specifying a number of portfolios
and a coherent measure of risk determining the risk of each portfolio. Coalitions of agents can
combine their portfolios and thereby create diversiﬁcation gains.
We prove that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced
games. This result ensures that a regulator can always allocate risk in a stable way. No matter
how the risk environment changes, there is always an allocation of risk that no coalition of
portfolios can object to.
To get exact games, we need an extra condition, since exact games are a subclass of totally
balanced games. Usually the risk of the aggregate portfolio is low compared to the risk involved
in the individual portfolios. As an extreme case, no aggregate uncertainty refers to the case when
the value of the aggregate portfolio is constant over all states of nature. We prove that the class
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of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games.
To show that all risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty are exact, we use one of the
characterizations of exact games developed in Chapter 3.
Thus, in the case of no aggregate uncertainty, for each coalition of portfolios, this coalition does
not necessarily beneﬁt from the diversiﬁcation opportunities offered by the aggregate portfo-
lio. As a consequence, the regulator has a high level of discretion in allocating the risk to the
individual portfolios in this case.
Convex games with transferable utility introduced by Shapley (1971) provide a further reﬁnement
of exact games, since convex games are a subset of exact games. If the number of players
(individual portfolios) below four, we show that one obtains the class of convex games in risk
allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty.
The assumption of transferable utility can be relaxed to obtain the class of games with non-
transferable utility (NTU games, for short). In a TU game it is assumed that utilities can be
transferred. Such an assumption is justiﬁed if there is a commodity which has the same marginal
utility for everyone and the utility functions are linear and separable in it. In general, this is
not the case and one would like to study the more general class of NTU games. An NTU game
speciﬁes the set of attainable utility levels for the members of each coalition.
The notion of convexity can be generalized to NTU games in at least ﬁve ways. Vilkov (1977) and
Sharkey (1981) have extended convexity to NTU games to deﬁne ordinal and cardinal convexity,
respectively. Hendrickx, Borm, and Timmer (2002) analyze coalitionmerge convexity, individual
merge convexity, and marginal convexity in an NTU setting.
The aforementioned ﬁve classes of NTU convex games do not coincide in general. The only
general result is that coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity, and individ-
ual merge convexity implies marginal convexity. It is natural to seek a result that is analogous
to convex TU games being exact. In Chapter 5 we generalize exactness to the NTU setting.
In an exact NTU game for each coalition there is a core element on the boundary of its payoff
set, meaning that this coalition does not necessarily beneﬁt from the gains of forming the grand
coalition in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional deviations. We show that each
of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uniﬁed under NTU
exactness, which gives a sensible, common property of the core for all those games.
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